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VENTURE CAPITAL ON THE DOWNSIDE:




When stock indices drop precipitously, when the startup
companies fizzle out, and when it stops raining money on places like
Wall Street and Silicon Valley, attention turns to downside
contracting. Law and business lawyers, sitting in the back seat as mere
facilitators on the upside, move up to the front and sometimes even
take the wheel. The job is the same on both the upside and downside:
to maximize the value of going concern assets. But what comes easily
on the upside can be dirty work on the down, where assets need to be
separated from dysfunctional teams of business people to stem the
flow of red ink to disappointed investors. The team members rarely go
quietly, no matter how unsuccessful. The outcome can turn on
provisions in contracts entered into on the upside - cookie-cutter
paragraphs in boilerplate forms, barely noticed when the cash flows
easily.
This Article takes the occasion of the simultaneous collapse of the
high technology stock market and the failure of the dot-coin startups,'
along with the subsequent retrenchment of the venture capital
business,2 to examine the law and economics of downside
arrangements in venture capital contracts. The subject matter
implicates core concerns of legal and economic theory of the firm.
Debates about the separation of ownership and control,3 relational
* Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law
School; Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1973,
Columbia; J.D. 1976, Columbia. - Ed. My thanks to John Armour, Mitu Gulati, William
Klein, Joe McCahery, Larry Mitchell, Per Str6mberg, and participants at the TIAS Business
School conference on e-business for comments on previous versions.
1. In the first seven months of 2001, 367 internet companies went out of business, and
nearly 83,000 dot-coin employees were laid off. One result was a marked uptick in
applications to business school. Big Ex-Techies On Campus, Bus. WK., Aug. 13,2001, at 8.
2. See Mark Heinzl, Starting Gate, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2001, at B5 (reporting that U.S.
venture capital investments in the first quarter of 2001 were $11.7 billion compared to $26.7
billion in the first quarter of 2000).
3. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure
of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993) (arguing that internal governance systems
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investing,4  takeover policy, the law and economics of debt
capitalization,5 and bankruptcy reform,6 all grapple with the downside
problem of controlling and terminating unsuccessful managers for the
benefit of outside debt and equity investors (and the related upside
problem of incentivizing effective but fallible managers). The factors
motivating these debates also bear on venture capital contracting. But
venture capital presents a special puzzle for solution. Convertible
preferred stock is the dominant financial contract in the venture
capital market,7 at least in the United States.8 This contrasts with other
contexts in corporate finance, where preferred stock is thought to be a
financing vehicle long in decline. The only mature firms that finance
with preferred, which once was ubiquitous in American capital
structures, tend to be firms in regulated industries having little choice
in the matter. Tax rules favoring debt finance provide the primary
explanation for preferred's decline. But many corporate law observers
would suggest dysfunctional downside contracting as a concomitant
cause. Simply, preferred performs badly on the downside, where
senior security contracts supposedly are at their most effective.
Preferred stockholders routinely have been victimized in distress
situations by opportunistic issuers who strip them of their contract
rights, transferring value to the junior equityholders who control the
are failing at the task of achieving the downsizing and disinvestment needed by the wider
economy).
4. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in
Industry, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE
SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE U.S., JAPAN, AND EUROPE 5-17 (Donald H. Chew ed.,
1997) (arguing for business and law reform toward the end of encouraging relational
investing).
5. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 323 (1986) (arguing that managers put
excess cash into suboptimal projects and need to be disciplined by high leverage and
takeovers).
6. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY 209-24
(1986) (arguing that bankrupt firms should be put up for sale as going concerns rather than
recapitalized).
7. See, e.g., William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990); Jeffrey J. Trester, Venture Capital Contracting
Under Asymmetric Information, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 675 (1998).
8. Douglas J. Cumming, The Convertible Preferred Equity Puzzle in Canadian Venture
Capital Finance (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 218352, 2001), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=218352, reports that preferred is not extensively utilized in
Canadian venture capital financing. This is even true with respect to U.S. venture capital
firms' investments in Canada. Douglas Cumming, United States Venture Capital Financial
Contracting: Evidence from Investments in Foreign Securities (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No.
288111, 2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=288111. D. Gordon Smith & Annaleena
Parhankagas, Conflict Management in the Entrepreneur-Venture Capitalist Relationship: An
International Comparative Study (working paper on file with author, June 2000) makes the
same report for Finland.
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firm's management. The cumulation of bad experiences adds impetus
to a wider trend in favor of debt as the mode of senior participation.
Venture capital finance is the exception to the trend. With
preferred stock as the investing vehicle of choice, the number of
venture capital funds increased from thirty-four with capital of $1.69
billion in 1991 to 228 funds with committed capital of $67.7 billion in
the peak year of 2000. 9 Given preferred stock's history of contract
failure, two questions arise. First, why do American venture capitalists
employ preferred instead of debt or common stock, and second, how,
if at all, do venture capital preferred contracts solve or avoid downside
failure? This Article draws on the economics of incomplete contracts
to offer answers to these questions.
The first line of downside defense for any outside source of capital
is not closing in the first place. Venture capital contracts employ this
defense to the utmost, staging the drawdowns of funds over time and
conditioning the funding commitment on performance targets. If the
stock issuer misses its target, the venture capitalist has the option of
refusing further funds. The venture capitalist's final line of downside
defense lies in its preferred stock redemption rights and liquidation
preference. Venture capital investments tend to have an intermediate
duration. If after five years or so the stock issuer has not produced a
payoff in the form of an initial public offering, the venture capitalist
has the backstop right to have its stock redeemed at the purchase
price. That right implies a power to terminate an issuer unable to fund
the redemption, along with priority rights respecting remaining assets.
Between these two lines of defense there lies a middle ground
where downside protection may also be needed. This is the ground
taken up in this Article. Here downside protection for a venture
capitalist means two things - first, power to replace the firm's
managers (or, alternatively, to force premature sale or liquidation of
the firm), and second, power to protect the venture contract itself
from opportunistic amendment. Venture capital investments possess
this protection in varying degrees, depending on the mode of their
participation and the governing contracts' terms. At the best-protected
end of the range of possibilities lie transactions where the venture
capitalist holds a majority of the voting shares, whether common or
preferred. This imports control of the board and all necessary power
to effect results in the firm. Thus situated, a holder of venture capital
preferred can block any opportunistic stripping of its priorities and
need not overly concern itself with the completeness of the protections
9. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Revolution, 15 J. ECON. PERSP.
145, 151, tbl.1 & n.a. (2001). For a concise overview of all aspects of venture capital
contracting, see Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About
Venture Capital Contracting (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 280024, 2001), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=280024.
March 2002]
HeinOnline -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 893 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
specified in its contracts. At the opposite, least-protected end of the
range of possibilities lie transactions where the venture capitalist holds
preferred in the absence of either a voting stock majority or control of
the board of directors. With no control whatsoever, the venture
capitalist has the burden of extracting protection in the form of
express terms of the type conventional in contracts governing senior
securities - promises to pay, negative covenants, liquidation
provisions, conditions on commitments to make additional
investments, and so forth. In many cases these provide a cumbersome,
unreliable means to achieve the fundamental downside objective of
removing managers or forcing a sale. To see why, consider the
archetypical case of a payment default on a bond contract. This is a
governance event because as a practical matter it forces a bankruptcy
reorganization. But Chapter 11 is designed in the first instance to
prevent the removal of managers and to avert a sale of the business.
The proceeding will be controlled initially by the incumbent
management, which will be biased toward the status quo and will lack
a strong commitment toward protecting the contract rights of senior
securityholders. 0
Until recently, academic observers assumed that venture capitalists
always insist on full protection, taking voting control of their portfolio
companies' shares and dominating their boardrooms. 1 New empirical
work shows that venture capitalists emerge with such full control at
both the shareholder and board level in only a significant minority of
cases." In another significant minority of cases, the venture capitalist
emerges at the vulnerable end of the range of protection, lacking
voting and boardroom control and relying entirely on terms
articulated ex ante in the preferred stock contract. In these cases, a
risk of exposure to issuer opportunism arises.
This Article evaluates this risk, reviewing contract terms employed
in venture capital transactions and the case law on preferred stock. A
mixed picture emerges. The terms of venture capital contracts
improve in significant respects on those of traditional preferred stock
contracts. But they are not perfect, and they offer incomplete
protection from issuer opportunism. Meanwhile, the case law is as
hostile as ever. Delaware has taken the lead, sustaining a classic case
of preferred stock victimization in a venture capital context. This
10. Under section 1121(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor in possession has the
exclusive right to propose a plan during the first 120 days of a proceeding. Section 1129(a),
(b) contemplates that seniors can be asked to give up value to juniors subject to the limit
that seniors must at least receive liquidation value. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(c), 1129(a), (b) (1994).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 17-20.
12. Steven Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No.
218175, 2000), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=218175.
[Vol. 100:891
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Article criticizes this approach as a matter of both contract law and
contract economics: contract law's good faith duty can be used to
protect venture capital preferred without a cognizable risk of
unproductive judicial interference in corporate affairs. The discussion
also suggests that Delaware's adherence to the traditional patterns of
treatment of preferred is short sighted. Venture capital contracts
present a unique alignment of financial and governance interests. A
responsive legal regime seeking venture capital incorporations will
tailor its contract and fiduciary principles accordingly, developing an
even-handed framework in which to arbitrate disputes.
VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS - THE CONTROL RANGE
Traditional Shared Control Full Voting
Contracts Control
Power to Weak Incomplete Full
Control Assets Contracting
Exposure to Yes No (stock majority) No
Contract Yes (stock minority)
Opportunism
The most likely venture capital transaction structure entails neither
full protection nor classic preferred stock vulnerability. In the majority
of transactions, the venture capitalist emerges at a midpoint on the
protection range, sharing control with the entrepreneur. Here the
defining characteristic is an open-ended balance of power in the
boardroom. The venture capitalist accordingly gets no unilateral
power to control the assets and terminate the entrepreneur on the
downside. Instead these matters are left open to contest. In a majority
of this subset of transactions, the venture capitalist takes a majority of
the voting stock even though it does not take a majority of board
seats. The stock majority imports determinative protection against the
stripping of contract rights. In a significant minority of these shared-
control transactions, however, the entrepreneur holds a minority of
the shares with control in the boardroom being shared. This
arrangement opens up a possibility of exposure to opportunism
respecting the preferred stock contract.
In sum, in a majority of venture capital transactions, the venture
capitalist takes a cognizable risk of not getting the results it wants on
March 20021
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the downside. This Article addresses the question of why this occurs
using a model of optimal capital structure in startup investment
contexts drawn from the economic literature of incomplete contracts.
The model, which abstracts from the leading description of control
transfer between entrepreneurs and outside capitalists proposed by
Phillippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, 3 lets us explain the pattern of
venture capital contracting in terms of the rational provision of
production incentives. 4  More particularly, shared control
arrangements are governance processes that avert problems of
noncontractibility. When parties enter into venture capital contracts
they are in a position to legislate respecting some but not all future
outcomes. Fabulous success, for example, presents allocational
problems but no questions respecting the entrepreneur's control of the
assets in the future. Total failure is similarly cut and dried - the
contracts trigger liquidation for the benefit of the venture capitalist
subject to the constraints of the bankruptcy system. Middling
outcomes are less amenable to advance specification. Here, control
transfers implicate complex business judgments outside the scope of
existing contract technologies. Such scenarios are better suited to
treatment through the operation of a contractually instituted
governance processes than through advance specification of a clear-
cut outcome. Venture capital's shared control arrangements achieve
this end, making the entrepreneur's day-to-day control of assets and
management contestable and facilitating control transfer at low cost
even while giving the entrepreneur some assurance that control
transfer power will not be arbitrarily exercised.
Part I begins by setting out recent empirical findings on venture
capital contracts. Next, Part I articulates the terms of the control
allocation model of optimal capital structure of Aghion and Bolton.
Part I then brings the real world contracting pattern to the model and
the model to the real world pattern.5 This encounter expands the
model's framework, yielding a menu of contract specifications and
governance processes from which parties to venture capital contracts
13. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete'Contracts Approach to Financial
Contracting, 59 REv. ECON. STUD. 473 (1992). In so doing, it follows the suggestion of
Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 12, that the Aghion-Bolton model is the most cogent of the
theoretical explications of venture capital relationships. Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation
of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29 RAND J. ECON. 57 (1998), makes the same
commendation.
14. The fit between the Aghion-Bolton construct and the real world contracting pattern
is not precise. In order to explain the ambiguous, shared control arrangements that dominate
venture capital contracting, the model's menu of modes of control transfer and
decisionmaking contingencies has to be expanded. This Article fills in the additional menu
items.
15. For another discussion of the Aghion-Bolton model and the Kaplan and Str6mberg
results, see Oliver Hart, Financial Contracting, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 1079,1084-90 (2001).
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can select. We emerge with a thick but workable description of control
relationships between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.
Part II turns to the legal environment and contracting practice
respecting the preferred stock. It begins by showing the ease with
which opportunistic managers have historically diverted value from
preferred holders. The discussion then turns to venture capital
preferred, showing how history repeated itself in the Delaware courts
in the leading case concerning the rights of venture capital preferred,
Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams.16 Finally, Part II returns to
real world venture capital contracting practice and the strategies it
employs to reverse the historical pattern of preferred exposure. The
verdict is one of qualified success.
The qualification is important, given a venture capitalist averse to
contract risk. This Article's analysis implies conservative advice:
invulnerability to issuer opportunism presupposes voting control of
the stock and, at a minimum, shared control in the boardroom. In the
present legal context, contract protections without control remain
unreliable. This advice is hardly satisfactory as a policy matter.
Accordingly, the Article concludes that the legal framework encasing
preferred stock has not evolved in an efficient direction.
I. CONTROL IN VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT: FROM PRACTICE
TO THEORY
This Part gathers, evaluates, and restates the economic learning on
venture capital contracts. Section A sets out recently reported data on
business practices respecting venture capital contracts. The data
displace a longstanding assumption that venture capitalists always take
complete voting control of their portfolio companies. Section B
describes incomplete contracts economics and explains its
appropriateness as a framework of inquiry respecting capital structure.
Section C sets out a basic incomplete contracts model of a control
transfer capital structure (the Control Transfer Model, or CTM),
abstracting from research by the economists Philippe Aghion and
Patrick Bolton. Section D expands the model's analytical framework
so as to provide a working account of real world venture capital
governance structures.
A. Contracts and Control Arrangements in Venture Capital Finance
In the once-prevailing story about venture capital transactions,
entrepreneurs so need venture capital that they cede both a majority
of stock and control of the boardroom. The control transfer to the
venture capitalist (VC) is only temporary, however. If the portfolio
16. 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997).
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company succeeds, control returns to the entrepreneur (E) when VC
sells its stock in an initial public offering ("IPO"). 7 Thus, in Ronald
Gilson and Bernard Black's description, the problem for solution with
venture capital contracts is E's lack of assurance against opportunistic
retention of control by VC through undue delay of the IPO. They
suggest that an "implicit contract" backed by reputational constraints
and financial incentives assures E that VC will voluntarily surrender
the reins. 8 Note that so long as VC has control, its senior status is
completely protected. Indeed, according to Gilson and Black, the
practice in venture capital transactions gives VC double protection,
investing it with veto power over business decisions through a full set
of business covenants. 9
The VC control story, however, has turned out to be incomplete.2'
The reversal is understandable. Venture capital transactions are
private placements. There is accordingly no public database respecting
their financial terms and contracting structures. Actors in the industry,
moreover, can be expected to take a proprietary view respecting their
transactions' documentation. The economists Kaplan and Stromberg
have broken new ground just by gathering data respecting the
contracts governing venture capital investments in 118 startups (200
separate instances of investment) made by fourteen venture capital
firms located across the country. The data displace the standard story,
showing that VCs do not always take control of their portfolio firms.1
The theory of the firm has a lot of explaining to do as a result.
17. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 253, 255-56, 260-61 (1998).
18. Id. at 257-64.
19. Id. at 261.
20. It also should be noted that the IPO is not the only means of VC exit on the upside.
Four additional routes are available: (1) the VC can retain all or part of its shares and sell
them into the trading market subsequent to the IPO; (2) the firm can be sold to a third-party
acquirer, with the VC taking a share of merger consideration upon exit; (3) the VC can sell
its shares to a third-party acquirer; and (4) the VC can sell its shares back to the issuer or to
E. Any of these exits can be partial or full. For discussion of possibilities and practices,
including empirical results in the U.S. and Canada, see Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G.
Macintosh, The Extent of Venture Capital Exits: Evidence from Canada and the United States
(SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 250519, 2000), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=250519.
Cumming and Maclntosh suggest that the likelihood of exit increases over time; the value
added by the VC declines as the firm matures, management becomes more seasoned, the
firm's business contacts are put in place, and product development and marketing issues are
resolved. D. Gordon Smith, Control Over Exit in Venture Capital Relationships (SSRN Elec.
Paper Coll. No. 272231, 2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=272231), studies the
regulation of exit in venture capital contracts, showing that the VC comes to acquire control
over exit over time.
21. Significantly, the touchstone discussion of venture capital contracting, Sahlman,
supra note 7, at 506, makes no assertion respecting the frequency of VC control. It does note
the incidence of shared control in the boardroom.
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Kaplan and Str6mberg find that one or the other party, VC or E,
has control of the board in only 38% of their cases. In this subset, the
VC takes control in two-thirds of the cases and the E takes control in
one-third of the cases. Also, cases of VC control are more likely to
occur in late stage financings. In the remaining 62% of the cases,
neither side takes control.22 Instead, the VC and the E each designate
a director for a seat or seats. They then agree on a candidate to fill the
remaining seat or seats. Under standard corporate law on allocation of
authority, control of the boardroom means control of the assets and
personnel.' The upshot on the downside, assuming conflicting views in
E and VC as to the best course of action, or, indeed, assuming that VC
wishes to remove E from the position of chief executive officer
("CEO"), is that the views and votes of the third director are outcome
determinative.
Kaplan and Str6mberg also collect data on voting control at the
shareholder level. At this point recall that while a majority of the
voting shares means boardroom control with plain vanilla corporate
documentation, standard corporate practice permits shareholders to
make special contractual arrangements respecting boardroom control.
Such is the case with venture capital transactions, which tend to
provide separate voting schemes for board election, on the one hand,
and for other matters on which shareholders vote, on the other hand.
The latter proceed on a one vote-per-share basis.24 Accordingly, voting
control over matters like charter amendments and mergers goes to the
actor, E or VC, holding the largest number of shares. The number of
and proportion of shares held by E and VC in turn will vary depending
on how well E performs. It is customary in venture capital contracting
to use stock ownership as a performance incentive for E, setting out
performance targets and providing that more stock vests in E as the
targets are met. Kaplan and Str6mberg report that in 70.8% of cases,
the VC controls a majority of the votes, assuming no performance-
based stock allocations to the E ever come to vest. Given full vesting,
the number of cases in which VC controls a majority decreases to
55.8%. E controls in 11.6% of the cases, rising to 23.1% given full
vesting. Neither party controls in 17.6%, rising to 21.1% given full
vesting. Some variance comes into the figures in subsets broken down
by round of investment. VC control is higher (86.8%, no vesting;
65.8% full vesting) in rounds conducted where the startup has not yet
produced revenues and lower in post revenue rounds (59.0% no
vesting; 48.7% full vesting). The net on the downside, where full
22. Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 12 (working paper at 17).
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
24. Or, in the case of the VC, a vote equal to the number of shares of common stock into
which its shares are convertible.
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vesting of E performance-based stock is unlikely to have occurred,
strongly favors VC voting control.
VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS - THE CONTROL RANGE
KAPLAN & STROMBERG'S RESULTS
Traditional Shared Voting
Contracts - Control Control in
E Voting VC
Control
Power to Control Assets / 13% 62% 25%




Majority of Voting Shares
No Vesting 11.6% 17.6% 70.8%
Full Vesting 23.1% 21.1% 55.8%
Kaplan and Str6mberg show strong correlations between share
voting control and board control. Where VC has voting control, VC
also has board control in 22.5% of the cases, but board control is
shared in 70% of the cases where VC has voting control. Where VC
never has voting control, board control is shared in 58.1% of the cases;
E controls in 38.7% of the cases. Where VC has voting control subject
to divestment given E equity vesting, board control is shared in 94.1%
of the cases. A correlation between voting rights and cash flow rights
also can be noted. The VC mean economic ownership claim in all
transactions assuming no vesting is 55.7% and 47.6% with full vesting.
Finally, Kaplan and Str6mberg report that in 15% of the cases, the
documentation defines a state of unacceptable suboptimal
performance in advance by reference to financial information and
provides for a state-contingent transfer of control to the venture
capitalist."
Summing up, shared control in the boardroom is the dominant
governance mode in the portfolio companies in Kaplan and
25. Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 12 (working paper at 59 tbl. 6, 60 tbl. 7).
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Stromberg's sample. It even prevails in a majority of the cases where
one or the other of VC or E has a majority of voting shares. But, at the
same time, VC and E each have boardroom control in significant
numbers of portfolio companies. This data complicates the
explanatory task for theory of the firm. The question is neither why
VC control, nor why E control. It is, first, why shared control in most
cases with outlier cases of VC control and E control? Second, how, if
at all, do the shared control arrangements described in Kaplan and
Str6mberg's sample function so as to assure full realization of a given
startup's profit potential?
B. Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm
This Article's principal assertion is that the value of shared control
lies in the fact that it makes E's day-to-day control of assets and
management contestable, facilitating control transfer at low cost even
as it gives E a degree of assurance against arbitrary and capricious
exercise of that control transfer power. To see why these factors are
important, look at the situation ex ante, before VC commits its money.
VC knows that E could have a valuable business idea even while
simultaneously turning out to be a poor manager. E knows that VCs
bring this skeptical point of view to their review of portfolio
companies, but E also knows that VCs are not immune to adverse
selection and may not be infallible in their business judgments. Both
parties also know that as events unfold, E and VC may interpret them
differently, with E as the inside party having an advantage respecting
hard information. There results a nascent conflict of interest, which
may or may not ripen depending on future events. A shared control
arrangement holds out advantages as a solution. It gives VC a
governance structure that contemplates ex ante that a professional
manager may have to replace E. At the same time, shared control lets
E take charge of the business without being VC's at-will employee, as
would be the case if VC had control of the board. The shared-control
arrangement leaves the matter of E's performance evaluation open
and waits for events to unfold.
VC will want to take control of the assets and replace E on a
moderate downside scenario26 - the portfolio company still has
prospects but E does not appear to be equipped to realize them. Such
mediocre or poor performance can stem from adverse selection or
moral hazard problems. In either case, it would not give rise to conflict
of interest and contracting problems between E and VC in a world
26. A catastrophic downside scenario arises when the portfolio company's business has
no prospects under anyone's management. Here VC contracts in the end provide for
termination with the VC taking the crumbs off the table. See infra text accompanying note
149.
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where E derives no private benefits from the control of assets. Oliver
Hart shows that in such an ideal (and taxless) world, first-best results
easily can be achieved with an all-common-stock capital structure and
a simple incentive compensation system. Hart describes a simple two-
period situation where the firm is founded at t = 0 and liquidated at t =
2, with an intermediate decision respecting liquidation or continuance
to be made at t = 1, along with a dividend payment. Hart would make
the compensation of the managing participant E depend entirely on
the dividend d. That is, incentive compensation I should equal "P(dl +
d2)," where P is a proportion of the firm's total returns. If the
payment also covers a proportion of liquidation proceeds L - I =
P[dl + (d2, L)] - E can be expected to make an optimal decision
respecting liquidation at t = 1. If the expected value of liquidation
returns at t = 1 is greater than the total returns expected at t = 2, the
firm is liquidated at t = 1 and no costly contracting designed to align
the manager's incentives with those of outside investors is necessary.27
Under this incentive structure there is no ex ante prospect of firm
continuance in the event of poor results.
The real world problem is that managers like E do derive private
benefits from asset management. In Hart's conception, the bribe
required to align their incentives with those of the outside security
holders is unfeasibly large.28 Accordingly, a complex capital structure
must be devised in order to align incentives in the direction of optimal
investment and management and to ensure that the actor with the
appropriate incentives controls the assets.
Incomplete contracts models of capital structure seek to describe
such incentive-compatible capital structures. They start with a
common sense definition of contracts: contracts are comprised of
advance specifications of future results. To the extent that a given
outcome cannot successfully be specified in advance, the subject
matter is noncontractible. The models make three assertions about
corporate contracts and capital structures. First, corporate contracts
can be expected to omit important future variables because of the
difficulty or impossibility of ex ante description. That is, the particular
posture of events on which critical governance outcomes will later
depend may not be sufficiently specifiable in advance so as to permit
the parties to draft in advance a contract term setting out appropriate
instructions. Second, corporate contracts can be expected to omit
27. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 146-48 (1995);
see also Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of
Venture Capitalists, 49 J. FIN. 371 (1994) (setting forth the fixed fraction model of venture
capitalist participation).
28. See HART, supra note 27, at 146-48. The treatment of Hellmann, supra note 13,
should be contrasted at this point. In that set up, E's private benefits from control may be
outweighed by the upside prospects of a payoff on E's common stock in the firm, which
payoff will be realized only if E gives up control.
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important future variables due to the difficulty or impossibility of ex
post observation and verification. 29 That is, even if the parties can
anticipate and describe future contingencies, once events have
unfolded in the future, no concrete factual basis may exist for the
operation of an advance legislative directive. To enforce a contractual
specification, you must be able to make a proof in court. Complex
facts of business life do not always lend themselves to such
presentations, especially by those outside the firm, whether
government regulators or VCs. Meanwhile, hard accounting numbers
produced by a firm do not by themselves direct business judgments
and are in any event subject to manipulation by insiders. And
noncontractibility may obtain because the requisite transactional
technologies do not yet exist.' Third, given the foregoing problems of
noncontractibility, important outcomes in corporate contracts will be
determined not by advance specification but by the firm's structure of
ownership. The specification of the owner and any associated
contingent control allocations built into the firm's contracts - in
particular the contracts making up the capital structure - substitute
for contract terms absent due to the condition of contractual
incompleteness.31
As the zone of noncontractible contingencies expands, the
ownership specifications become more important. Ownership and
control of the assets will not be vested in perpetuity in a single actor,
because doing so would both imply a low-powered performance
incentive and leave the firm without defense against adverse selection
and opportunism. In this conceptualization, the firm's present owners
are the actors who direct its ongoing management and investment
policies, or, in the alternative, who determine whether to sell or
29. For contributions to the literature making this point, see Sanford J. Grossman &
Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts
and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Incomplete
Contracts]; Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991) (special issue)
(showing that contracts that tie an agent's compensation to verifiable measures can divert
effort and attention from other more important but less easily measured aspects of
performance).
30. Unlike most law and economics, which tends to include any voluntary economic
relation within its notion of the ex ante contract, incomplete contracts theory restricts the
reach of the ex ante contract to cases where actors make explicit specifications about the
future. That is, to have "contract" terms that govern future states, those contingent states
must be specified and the future outcomes must be computable. Since many future states of
nature clearly are not computable, transacting parties as a result lack the technology
necessary to enable the negotiation and composition of a contract term ex ante. See Luca
Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature,
109 Q.J. ECON. 1085 (1994).
31. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 479.
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liquidate the firm.32 In the event of suboptimal performance, control
transfer to an actor possessing more compatible incentives may be
advisable. The firm's performance thus depends on the incentives not
only of its present owners but of its contingent future owners. Optimal
capital structure depends on the control transfer arrangements that
shape these incentives.33
Significantly, incomplete contracts economics makes no resort to
"implicit contracts" as it describes governance structures. The term
implicit contracts, as used in law and economics, describes
counterparty conduct that a given contract party expects (often in a
situation of trust or reliance), but as to which no explicit requirement
exists in the contract. Such expectations often arise respecting future
events as to which contractual specification satisfying all parties is
difficult or impossible. Implicit contracts fill these gaps. But they do
not do so as implied, legally enforceable duties, as do the implied
contracts of contract law. In the law and economics usage, no legal
constraints follow from the identification of an implicit contract. More
often than not, the dependent party is left exposed to counterparty
opportunism and remitted to self-protection through explicit
contracting the next time around. In giving this instruction, the
implicit contracts approach makes a significant assumption - that the
zone of contractibility is universal and that incomplete contracts
always can be completed. Given that assumption, it appears to make
good policy sense to deploy the law so as to force the parties to
conclude their own contracts rather than insert contract terms devised
by judges acting ex post.34
Incomplete contracts economics holds out a distinctly different
approach to contracts because it does not assume universal
32. Notably, "owner" is here specially defined as the party who has the right to control
all aspects of the asset that have not been given over to contractual specification ex ante.
Grossman & Hart, supra note 29, at 695. Under this definition, ownership and control
cannot be separated, although they can be shared. Since asset control is ownership, residual
claimants who do not manage are not owners, whatever the law's contemplation.
33. It should be noted that the basic assertions of the incomplete contracts school are a
subject of debate in economic theory. See Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen
Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83 (1999), for an argument
that parties can indeed design contracts that overcome the problems the school describes as
"noncontractible," and that irrelevance obtains as between an incomplete contract left open
to ex post renegotiation and a contract with described trades. The response appears in
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115
(1999) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Foundations].
34. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 445 (1993) (asserting a presumption in favor of forcing parties to get their own
contracts). At the same time, gaps can be filled in when the decisionmaker knows what the
actors would have agreed on in a costless contracting environment. See, e.g., Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1550-52
(1989). To the author's knowledge, the latter principle has never been brought to bear to
protect a senior securityholder.
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contractibility. Indeed, it holds that transacting actors can create
producing institutions that assuredly evolve toward the first-best only
to the extent that they deal with contractible subject matter. Absent
contractibility, we necessarily are in a second-best world, where the
function of economics is to identify and explain barriers that prevent
the evolution of first-best transaction structures. In this second-best
world, no all-pervasive presumption against regulation arises. Where
subject matter is noncontractible, problems have to be sorted out ex
post, and it makes no sense to remit parties to ex ante contract. It does
not necessarily follow that a given judicial or other regulatory
intervention will move actors in a productive direction. In theory,
given ideal circumstances, incompleteness only means that the parties
themselves renegotiate ex post once the requisite facts are on the
table. 5 In the real world, however, such renegotiations do not
necessarily occur under ideal conditions. Determinations about the
desirability of judicial intervention to protect against opportunism
accordingly have to be made case by case.
C. The Contingent Control Model
There follows a contingent control transfer model ("CTM")
abstracted from precedent work by Aghion and Bolton so as to appear
in an accessible form keyed to the description of real world venture
capital arrangements. 6 The CTM is well suited to the exposition of the
control transfer problem in venture capital contexts. 7 This section
recounts its main properties. The section that follows discusses its
implications for real world venture capital contracting.
1. The Setup
Once again we get a two-period model built on a stylized picture of
the relationship between E and VC. The two-period framework
follows the life of a firm from birth to liquidation, facilitating a
dynamic inquiry into the incentive effects of different capital
structures. An amount K is invested in the firm at t = 0; all of K comes
from VC. The firm is liquidated at t = 2, when monetary returns r are
35. The dispute between Maskin & Tirole and Hart & Moore, see supra note 33, in part
turns on whether the parties credibly can commit not to renegotiate. If they can, then the
case for investing resources in advance specification strengthens. See Hart & Moore,
Foundations, supra note 33, at 128.
36. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 479. The model is applied in the context of a
discussion of dividend policy in William W. Bratton, Dividends, Noncontractibility, and
Corporate Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 409, 429-34 (1997). For contrasting theoretical
pictures of control transfer in senior-junior security holder contexts, see G. Mitu Gulati et
al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 908-18 (1999); D. Gordon Smith, Team
Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949 (1999).
37. See Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 12.
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realized. The amount of the payout will depend on an action a to be
taken from among the set of feasible actions A by the actor in control
of the firm after the realization of a state of nature 0 at t = 1. There are
only two possible future states of nature, a good business state 0, and a
bad business state 0 Different actions a will be optimal depending on
which state occurs. More particularly, action set A contains only two
possible actions, ag and ab, in each of the two states of nature 0g and 0.
In state 0g the maximizing choice of action a* is a,, and in state 0b the
first-best choice of action a* is ab. Just which 0 is going to occur is not
clear at t = 0, when E and VC enter into a contract which must address
the contingency of respecting the future choice of a. At t = 1,
immediately prior to the time for the choice of a, the operation of the
business will produce a signal s as to the state of nature 0g or 0 38
CONTINGENT CONTROL MODEL - TIME SEQUENCE
Investment Signal s Realization of K
as to 0 returns r
t=0 t=1 t=2
Action a taken
The model works the classic conflict-of-interest problem between
E and VC through this framework. The interests come into conflict
because returns to E and VC are received in different forms such that
choices of different actions a can impact them differentially.
Monetary returns of the project r are payable to VC at t = 2, minus
amounts of compensation payable to E pursuant to a compensation
schedule in the contract concluded at t = 0 by E and VC. The
compensation arrangement provides a transfer t > 0, the precise
amount of which is a function of s and r. Thus VC's payout y = r - t.
38. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 475-78. The model also assumes that E has no
wealth and needs to finance the entire startup cost K for her project. A number of additional
assumptions are made. There are only two possible outcomes for s, 0 or 1, with s = 1 meaning
that it is more probable than not that 0 = 0, and s = 0 meaning that it is more probable than
not that 0 = 0b
. 
In order to make the initial investment of K plausible, the probability q of y,
+ (1 - q)Y, > K. In addition, there are only two possible returns r at t = 2, either 0 or 1, and
the initial contract between E and VC may be renegotiated after the realization of 0, with all
the bargaining power lying with E. Id. at 477-79.
39. The model assumes that both E and VC are risk neutral as to income. Id. at 476.
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Critically, E also receives significant, nonmonetary private benefits b,
such as reputation, which are not also received by VC. The quantum
of b is a legitimate part of the overall yield of value from the project,
but is neither observable nor verifiable by third parties. Yields of both
r and b will depend on the state of nature 0 and the choice of a. E's
yield is a function of r(a,O) + b(a,O), and VC's yield is solely a function
of r(a,Q). The conflict of interest devolves on the choice of a because
the choice of a can differentially impact r and b, and open up a
significant differential of returns between VC and E.4"
E and VC confront significant problems of noncontractibility at t =
0. It would be easy if the state of nature 0 could be specified ex ante.
Then it might be possible for the contract between E and VC to direct
the party in control, presumably E, to take a jointly maximizing action
a*. Unfortunately 0 is impossible or very costly to describe ex ante,
although the parties will be able to identify 6 ex post, at t = 2. The
model does, however, assume that even though the E-VC contract
cannot be made directly contingent on 0, it can be made contingent on
the signal s, which is verifiable although imperfectly correlated with e.
Even so, the occurrence of s at t = 1 does not enable the drafting of a
complete contract. Even if s perfectly correlated with 0, the project
still would be too complex to permit an ex ante specification of the
optimizing response ag or ab upon the realization of s. Although the set
of choices will be limited to ag and ab, the model makes the realistic
assumption that both will lie wholly within the realm of traditional
management business judgment to be exercised by the actor in control
of the firm. Neither is susceptible to direct specification or to indirect
specification through a constellation of affirmative and negative
covenants.4
The upshot is that the capital structure's allocation of control rights
between E and VC will determine the choice of a and the level of
value, optimal or suboptimal, yielded by the firm.42 The capital
structure, as set out in the E-VC contract, inevitably specifies an
allocation of control which in turn determines which actor has the
privilege to chose action a. Control can lie in E or in VC or in both.
40. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 476. Given the specification of first best action a
and ab, the expected returns y and private benefits b realized by VC and E in 1g and 0b will
have the following properties:
yOa, + bOa 8 > yOga, + bOgab
yOgab + bObab > yOa, + bOba,
41. Direct specification might be possible in a different case, where a. and a, entail a
selection between a limited set of choices identifiable in advance - for example, either
merger, liquidation, or sale of assets. But even given the feasibility of that sort of
specification, ex post judicial enforcement of the contractual directive could still fall short of
feasibility if information asymmetries led to problems of third-party verification. Aghion &
Bolton, supra note 13, at 477-78.
42. Id. at 476-77.
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The CTM works through the scenarios of E control, VC control, and
joint control to ascertain the distance between the set of results built
in by the incentive structure and first-best set of results.. Where E
controls, a first-best choice of action follows automatically only when
the choice of a* also happens to maximize y, b, and the transfer
payment t. Here E's incentives are perfectly aligned with the general
maximizing result. 3 But, given the way the CTM is set up, on some
outcomes the incentives are misaligned - when E controls, its private
benefits cause it to make the wrong choice on a bad outcome. VC's
choice of action is suboptimal on a good outcome.
The CTM runs two modes of working around the misaligned
incentives. The first is Coasian bargaining, modeled on the assumption
that the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power." The second is
control transfer specified in advance in the E-VC contract and
triggered by the signal s.
2. Coasian Bargaining
It is a truism of law and economics that even given misaligned
incentives, an optimal result, here a*, can result from a round of
Coasian bargaining ex post. Given subject matter presenting
contractibility problems, Coasian bargaining is a particularly attractive
alternative because it lets the parties leave the matter open ex ante,
saving on transaction costs and avoiding use of dysfunctional
provisions. In the CTM, a round of negotiation would occur after the
realization of s at t = 1 in which a noncontrolling party benefitted by
the choice of a* purchases its choice by the controlling party with a
side payment. 5 Assuming 6b, we speak of a case where a* = a6, but the
private benefit return b to E yielded by a choice of a suboptimal
choice of ag is greater than value of b yielded by the choice of a*. In
addition, the yield of y to VC is greater if a* is chosen over ag.46 For
simplicity, the model assumes that E has all the bargaining power.
Given the above alignment of values, E will offer to choose a* (here
Obab) if VC pays E the sum equal to the difference between the value
of y yielded on the choice of a* and the value of y yielded on a
suboptimal choice of a.47 VC can be expected to accept the offer
provided that the amount offered is greater than its original
43. Id. at 480-81.
44. The model assumes that the world is full of venture capitalists but contains only a
few entrepreneurs with good projects. E as a result has all the bargaining power: E can make
a take-it-or-leave-it offer which VC will accept so long as the deal holds out an expected
return of at least K. Id. at 480-82.
45. See HART, supra note 27, at 98 (discussing the Aghion-Bolton model).
46. That is, b(Oa) + t > b(Oa) + t, and y(Oa,) > y(Oa).
47. That is, y(Oba) - y(Oa), provided that b(Oba) + t + y(Oa) - y(Oba) > b(Oba,) + t.
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investment K.48 Assuming 01, then a* = ag, and a round of bargaining
results if the private benefit return b to E yielded by a suboptimal
choice of ab is greater than the yield of b on a choice of a* and the
yield of y to VC is greater where a* is chosen over ab. 4 Since E has all
the bargaining power, E will offer to choose a* (here Ogag) if VC pays
E the difference between the value of y yielded on the choice of a*
and the value of y yielded on a suboptimal choice of a.5" Once again,
VC can be expected to accept the offer provided that the amount
offered is greater than its original investment K. Stated differently, on
a bad state with E in control, if the increase in returns to VC that
results from substituting an optimal choice of action is greater than the
differential in returns to E that results from abandoning the
suboptimal action, then VC, given the signal of a bad outcome, will
bribe E with a payment that at least makes up E's differential so long
as the returns to VC net of the payments pay back at least its original
investment and make it better off than it would be with the suboptimal
choice.
The problem is that, given the CTM's set up, Coasian bargaining
does not always lead to an efficient result. This insufficiency stems
from the fact that renegotiation leading to a* does not result in every
case. The model assumes, realistically enough, that the return of at
least K constitutes a rationality constraint for VC. Thus, the
renegotiation fails and the first-best result will not be chosen if the
value of K is so high that it exceeds the yield on offer by E. The very
possibility that this situation could arise has destabilizing implications
for the whole deal: VC can be expected to refuse to invest at t = 0
unless some form of protection against E's opportunism is included in
the contract package."
In general, Coasian bargaining fails to assure optimal results in
midstream corporate contexts where the interests of the party
48. That is, y(Oaba) > K.
49. That is, where b(iab) + t > b(Oa) + t, and y(Oa) > y(i a).
50. That is, y(i a) - y(OSa), provided that b(Oa) + t + y(O a) - y( a) >_ b(98a) + t.
51. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 480-83. The CTM runs the VC control
scenario with similarly equivocal results. Here first-best choices of action will follow only
where the choice of a that maximizes y happens to be a*, meaning that VC's incentives are
perfectly aligned with the general maximizing result. Where the choice of a that maximizes y
is not first-best there can be room for Pareto-improving renegotiation in the form of a bribe
paid to the actor in control by the actor disadvantaged by the suboptimal choice of a. But
once again, it turns out that the optimal choice a* does not result in every case. The model's
reasonable assumption of a wealth constraint on E's part (VC provides all of K) substantially
limits the possibility of renegotiation where VC controls. Simply put, since b and t constitute
E's entire wealth, E lacks the resources to make the bribe. For VC control to assure first-best
results, then, the amount of t has to be set high enough to give E sufficient cash for the bribe.
But this adjustment, in turn, returns us to the same place as the search for the first-best
under E control. As t increases, projected investment returns to VC fall short of K at some
point and VC refuses to invest. Id. at 483-84.
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controlling the assets (usually E or management) in the conduct of the
business differ from those of contributors of capital (usually VC or
outside equity). This generalization is intuitively attractive, and it
obtains even in the absence of bargaining costs, endowment effects, or
collective action problems, the latter being the factor usually cited
against midstream renegotiation of corporate contracts.52 The key to
the result is the CTM's ascription of bargaining power to E. With that
power, E can negotiate VC down to an ex post return y that is less
than VC's original investment K. That result kills the deal ex ante. In
the real world, in the absence of fiduciary constraints, protective
contract terms, or an immediately exercisable contingent control
power to terminate E, E will have significant bargaining power along
the lines assumed in the CTM. The power arises in the first instance
from the information asymmetries favoring E. Costs and other
frictions in the way of E's removal enhance that bargaining power. As
the power grows, VC's investment returns shrink.
It follows, logically enough, that VC (or any other outside equity
investor) needs one of three things - fiduciary protection, protective
contract terms, or an immediately exercisable contingent control
power. The CTM proceeds to the third of these alternatives.
3. Control Transfer by Advance Specification
The CTM employs the device of contingent control to solve the
problem presented by the misalignment of the incentives of E and VC
so as to yield results superior to that of Coasian renegotiation. Two
additional assumptions have to be made to support the contingent
control device's operation - that VC's returns are higher when a
suboptimal choice of a is made in 0. states, and that E's returns are
higher when a suboptimal choice of a is made in eb states." With this
alignment, VC will make a first-best choice in 0b and E will make a
first-best choice in 0., and a contract that accords control to VC in 0b
and E in 0, will be optimal. These assumptions reflect an appealing
intuition about the governance of startups. E knows the business and
should not be disturbed on 06 scenarios. But since E also derives
private benefits from control of the business, E is ill suited to make an
optimal choice of business plan, or an optimal decision between
termination and continuance, in 0b states.
Since 0 is unverifiable, the feasibility of a contingent control
arrangement depends on the degree of correlation between s and 0."
Given the requisite correlation, an optimal arrangement can be made
52. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:
An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1664-65 (1989).
53. That is, that yOa, < yoga, and that bOa, < bOa.
54. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 484-86.
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operational with relative ease in a world with a frictionless bankruptcy
process. Thus does the CTM use a contract provision to avert
difficulties stemming from the noncontractible nature of 0. More
particularly, VC's participation in the firm takes the form of debt. The
realization of s at t = 1 is made a default/no-default event, with default
occurring in a e, state." In the event of default, E becomes bankrupt
and VC takes control, choosing the first-best a; in 0 states there is no
default and E stays in charge. 6 The same result can be effected with
preferred stock (in a frictionless world). The realization of s signaling
an eb state triggers a redemption of VC's stock. If E does not have a
source of substitute capital, the duty to redeem causes bankruptcy and
the same result as debt finance. 7
4. Implications
The CTM has a number of intuitively attractive implications. The
assertion that hard-wired contingent control transfers dominate over
backroom renegotiations resonates well. The model also raises a
pertinent question respecting the relative effectiveness of employment
contracts and control transfer structures as means of channelling E's
incentives in productive directions. The model implies that where
crucial management choices - selections of a from sets A - are
noncontractible due to problems of observability and verifiability and
where E enjoys private benefits, monetary incentive schemes based on
firm profitability or stock market performance cannot be expected to
import adequate discipline. Control structures allowing outsider
investors to take actions that managers dislike in the event of poor
firm performance, although a second-best solution, can be expected to
do a more effective job of manipulating management incentives in
productive directions.58
But the CTM's exclusive reliance on bankruptcy control transfer
makes its transition to real world practice problematic. Bankruptcy,
after all, is a drastic and costly step to have to take. The next section
works past this sticking point.
55. The precedent model is in Jaime F. Zender, Optimal Financial Instruments, 46 J.
FIN. 1645 (1991).
56. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 487.
57. Provided there is not a significant amount of debt, which by definition is senior to
VC's preferred stock, in the capital structure.
58. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of
Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1027-28 (1994).
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D. The CTM and the Role of Senior Securities in Venture Capital
Contracting
This section moves the CTM a step in the direction of the real
world practice described in Section A by relaxing some assumptions
and expanding the menu of contractual devices implicating control
and control transfer.
At first inspection, the data set out in Section A appear to suggest
that the CTM's analytical structure lacks predictive power in the
venture capital context. Recall that the most likely real world
arrangement is shared control, and the next most likely is vesting of
control in one party or the other. Contingent control transfer devices
based on advance specification of an s show up in a minority of the
cases. But the data nonetheless instantiate the CTM's dynamic in
significant ways. For one thing, the real world venture capital
contracts' boardroom-control arrangements have to be read together
with their financial provisions. These invariably provide for
redemption of the preferred held by VC in the intermediate term. This
means that in an extreme 0b state the contracts provide for a
bankruptcy transfer of control, exactly as predicted by the CTM. On
the other hand, the CTM has less immediate relevance with respect to
control transfer in 0, states where turn around remains a possibility
and 0, states where retention of E will be profitable but suboptimal.
But the framework can be adopted to assist our understanding of
these situations.
The CTM's limitations stem from two components. First, it effects
its contingent control transfer through a bankruptcy proceeding on the
assumption that bankruptcy is frictionless. In the real world,
bankruptcy costs are onerous." Venture capital practice shows us that
these costs do not have to be incurred to effect a contingent control
transfer. Second, the model limits itself to a contract term as it
attempts to deal with the problem of noncontractibility. In so doing it
hypothesizes an imperfect but plausible element of contractible
subject matter: Although 0 is unverifiable, the trigger s is verifiable
even though it is not a perfect proxy for 0. But what of cases where no
reliable s exists, or where the parties cannot agree on one? In these
cases some other control transfer device must be employed. The
discussion that follows expands the menu of possibilities to include
processes implicating control transfer and operating on an open-ended
basis, dispensing with contractual triggers.
59. See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy
Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067 (1984) (estimating total bankruptcy costs to be 20% of the
value of the firm).
[Vol. 100:891
HeinOnline -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 912 2001-2002
March 2002] Venture Capital
1. Bankruptcy Versus Boardroom Control Transfer
The CTM's assumption that control transfer occurs on a
bankruptcy scenario can be relaxed easily by reference to standard
tools of corporate law practice. In a close corporation context, changes
of control in the boardroom can be contracted for in advance, even if
the VC takes preferred stock. E and VC simply enter into a "pooling
agreement," contracting in their capacity as shareholders with respect
to their future votes. In the context of the CTM, they would execute a
voting agreement pursuant to which the occurrence of s signaling an 0,
state would trigger the extension of a contingent irrevocable proxy
from E to VC. The proxy would give VC the votes to elect a majority
of the board and to remove incumbent directors. With boardroom
control, VC can choose the CEO who will choose a*Ob.6o
60. See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 58. Although still a model denominated as a
debt-equity model, it nonetheless captures the dynamic of a boardroom control transfer.
This is another two-period contingent control model. Unlike the Aghion-Bolton model, this
one includes outside debt and outside equity interests. Here, at t = 0, outside financing and
incentive compensation arrangements are worked out and management chooses an effort
level e. The level of e will be either high or low, with high e producing higher returns in later
periods but resulting in the incurrence of a utility cost U to the managers. At t = 1 the firm
reports its first period profit, npl, a verifiable amount that is determined by e, but which is
not a sufficient statistic for e. In addition, a signal s is realized at this point. The distribution
of signal s also is determined by e, and s is a sufficient statistic for the profit to be realized at f
= 2, np2. But s is noncontractible and management compensation accordingly cannot be
made directly contingent on it.
This model's distinguishing assumption is that the firm's capital structure accords
decisionrmaking power to either the outside debtholder or the outside equityholder at a
critical moment. More specifically, immediately after t = 1, the outside holder accorded this
control power takes action a, which can either be acquiescence and continuance C in present
management operations or stoppage S of management's continued pursuit of its business
plan. Stoppage S can entail any number of subsequent actions, including liquidation, sale of
a division or other downsizing, or redirection of investment policy. Whatever the action
taken, for any given signal s, S entails less risky subsequent management than C, the
probability distribution of which has fatter upper and lower tails. At t = 2, np2 is realized and
income is shared in accordance with the contracts in the capital structure. Id. at 1031-34.
Investment, Realization of npl
Contract and signal s Realization of np2
I I I I
t = 0 Choice t = 1 Action a taken t = 2
of e
The model examines two possible compensation incentive schemes for E: one
constituted of private benefits only and the other including a salary. The purpose of any such
scheme is of course to induce E to choose a high level e. But given the model, and in
particular the noncontractibility of s, the optimal arrangement must include a possibility of
punishment in the form of a control transfer to outsiders who have the power to choose
action S. Since management always prefers C to S (whether or not C is efficient), a structure
that increases the possibility of such intervention as npl and s decline lends management an
incentive to choose a high level of e, maximizing the possibility of a choice of C despite the
cost of U thereby incurred. Given this, any bonus payments should be based on earnings
results of both np1 and np2, with the np2 target level rising as the np1 amount declines. Id. at
1035-39.
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The two different methods of control transfer, in the boardroom
and through liquidation, are suited to different business outcomes.
One accordingly would expect to see both employed in real world
arrangements. Significantly, the CTM interpolates only two business
situations - the selection of a from the range A in e, and 0, states. In
practice, there will be an open-ended range of such future choices: a
from A, b from B, c from C, and so on, and Og and 0b will cover a range
of outcomes. When such a choice concerns a change in the business
plan or the replacement of key personnel, whether in an 0g or 0b state,
the boardroom control transfer mode is indicated. The liquidation
trigger, in contrast, is better suited to severe eb states calling for
disinvestment.61
Another distinction between control transfer by redemption and
bankruptcy and control transfer by boardroom election should be
noted. The former mode of transfer implies VC financing by a senior
security, whether debt or preferred. That is because when redemption
causes insolvency, control devolves to VC because it holds a
liquidation preference over E in the bankruptcy distribution.
Boardroom control transfer can be (and often is) effected in a firm
funded entirely with common stock and does not implicate an
insolvency proceeding. This implies a real world preference for
transfer by boardroom control transfer provisions over control
transfer through redemption and liquidation if only because
bankruptcy is costly in the real world.62 But the prediction must be
qualified because redemption does not necessarily lead to a
bankruptcy proceeding. If the going concern retains value, the
triggering of the redemption right can become the occasion for
renegotiation between VC and E. Since VC now has the option of
forcing insolvency, it comes to the table with cognizable bargaining
power.63
2. Debt, Preferred, or Common?
The foregoing discussion gives rise to two further questions about
venture capital contracts: Why preferred stock and not debt? And,
why preferred and not common stock? To ask the former question is
to note that the periodic payment properties of noncumulative
convertible preferred can be mimicked in part with a convertible
61. For a model amplifying the efficiency properties of creditors' liquidation rights, see
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 1 (1998).
62. See supra text accompanying note 59.
63. If the going concern retains more value still, E can refinance and pay off VC. If VC
is the party positioned to choose a* the result is suboptimal.
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income bond.' Such a security would import the same high-powered
incentives to E as does convertible preferred. Where the preferred
holder gets an intermediate term right to put the stock back to the
issuer, the convertible bondholder gets the substance of that right with
intermediate term maturity. Either way, VC gets a liquidation
preference that has the effect of raising the cost to E of poor
performance.65 Packaging this convertible senior security as debt
would carry two additional benefits for VC: a higher and harder
bankruptcy priority and a chance for a tax deduction on interest
payments.66
But American corporate law holds out a significant disincentive to
the packaging of venture capital participation as debt. VCs commonly
do more than monitor their investments and facilitate the hiring of
professional managers by their portfolio companies; they often control
or influence the decision to replace the CEO and make other key
business decisions.67 To the extent that the transaction structure holds
out the prospect of significant VC input in management, including the
power to specify business results, VC should act in the capacity of an
equity securityholder at the time it exercises such control power. A
debtholder who exercises control power in that capacity loses its
limited liability status, and could be personally liable to other creditors
of the firm or even to E in the event its management decisions work
out badly.' Debtholders can influence control while retaining limited
liability only indirectly, by specifying default events ex ante in negative
covenants. In order to structure meaningful control by a debtholder,
then, a basis of contractible subject matter is needed. In the
alternative, a contingent control transfer to a debtholder can be
effected without risk of unlimited liability on the scenario posed by the
CTM - default, bankruptcy, emergence with VC in charge,
64. Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 12 (working paper at 18), report that preferred
dividends are cumulative in only 46% of the cases. This suggests that periodic income is not
a primary concern here.
65. Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9 (working paper at 10).
66. For the tax deduction, a firm promise to pay would be necessary. The income
contingency would not strengthen the case. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398
F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968).
67. Klausner & Litwak, supra note 9 (working paper at 4-5).
68. The classic case, Martin v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77 (N.Y. 1927), concerns a loan to a
partnership. The liability of bank lenders to small businesses is the subject of leading cases in
recent years. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); State
Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984). See generally
Margaret Hambrecht Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper
Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343
(1975). There is of course a way to deflect this risk for a debt holding VC with control power.
If the VC is a human being, one forms a wholly owned shell corporation or limited liability
company to hold the debt; if the VC is a corporation, it forms a shell wholly owned
subsidiary. Both steps are costly, and there remains a residual risk of veil piercing.
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presumably as the holder of all of the equity of a reorganized firm. But
as noted above, bankruptcy costs make this a second-best alternative
in real world planning.
The preferred/common stock choice turns in part on priorities. In
the CTM, E takes periodic return in salary t. If VC takes its position in
common stock and E also holds some common as an incentive device,
VC and E would share what is left of r at t = 2 pro rata, which would
mean a double dip for E. If VC holds stock with an income preference,
VC takes r-t, to the extent of the preference and any common stock
held by E would pay in addition to t only to the extent that VC's
preference is satisfied fully. More generally, in small business
planning, preferred and debt are standard tools for compensating
financial participants where the entrepreneurs take much of their
share of free cash flows in the form of salary payments.69 In addition,
on downside scenarios preferred means a priority to whatever is left in
liquidation.7" Finally, there is an exogenous regulatory concern.
Regulated institutional investors participating in the venture capital
partnership, such as insurance companies, will prefer to take their
equity in the form of convertible senior securities so as to satisfy legal
constraints on the amount of common stock in their investment
portfolios."
3. Shared Control
We turn now to the CTM's assumption that even though a* cannot
be specified in advance, the parties can, to the extent they deem s
reliable, contract ex ante to change control for the purpose of making
the selection of a* more likely. This setup is descriptive of
innumerable instances in practice. Financial contracts routinely utilize
such imperfect but verifiable signals. Such real world manifestations of
s are the accounting and performance data utilized in the drafting of
representations, closing conditions, covenants, and default triggers.
69. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT E. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.21 (3d ed. 1998). Sahlman, supra note 21, at 510, suggests an
additional tax reason. The overhang of preferred rights lowers the value of the common for
tax purposes, permitting E to buy the common stock at low prices without reporting taxable
income on the differential between the amount paid and the greater amount paid by VC. See
also Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9 (working paper at 9).
70. One could presumably replicate the preferred stock outcome by placing in VC a
combination of common stock and debt. This would, however, mean a process burden on
VC in the event of exercise of control to make it clear that it acted in the capacity of a
common stockholder. A residual litigation risk would endure even so.
71. Incidence of insurance company participation in venture capital firms varies from
year to year. PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 8-9
tbl.1.1 (1999), shows that insurance company and bank participation levels in venture capital
partnerships amounted to 16% in 1978, 15% in 1987, and 18% in 1995, but 4% in 1979, 6%
in 1991 and 1% in 1997. Public and private pension funds consistently are the largest
investors, putting in 40% of the capital in 1997.
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Indeed, 15% of the cases in Kaplan and Str6mberg's sample specify
boardroom control transfers to VC based on a financial or
performance s.
More difficult contracting problems arise where governance
intervention needs to be specified but s is unreliable, unverifiable, or
there is no s. If we stay within the confines of the CTM, the lack of s
means that nothing exists to trigger a transfer of control and VC has to
let the investment ride until t =2. At that point, given a 0b state, VC's
dividend and liquidation priorities assume paramount importance, but
the payoff may be suboptimal.
Let us abandon the CTM's hard assumptions respecting payouts to
E and VC and the choice of action a,72 and instead assume that the
choice among ag and ab on Og and 0b states depends on complex and
probabilistic factors so that there is no clear cut connection between E
or VC control and the optimal choice of a. Although it always is
optimal in the model to leave E in charge on 6g states, now it is
plausible to suggest that VC could effect a*g simply by removing E
and undertaking a search for a substitute chief executive better suited
to grappling with the problems at hand and bringing about a*. But
because the decision that a substitute is better fitted to effect a*eg
follows from a complex business judgment, there may be no basis with
which to provide for this control allocation ex ante. The same sort of
problem could arise in an 0, state where correction remains possible,
with the new CEO being charged with the job of turning the operation
around. Such scenarios are better suited to treatment through the
operation of a contractually instituted governance process than
through advance contractual specification of a clear-cut outcome.
Joint control suggests itself as a solution in these cases.73 In Aghion
and Bolton's CTM, joint control is defined very narrowly to mean that
either E and VC both agree, or that in the event of disagreement, E
will make a one-time, take-it-or-leave-it offer to VC as to choice of a;
in the event that VC refuses the offer, deadlock results and the returns
to both parties are zero. Such a joint control set up means that hold
ups are a possibility in every case. As a result, in Aghion and Bolton's
model, joint control always is dominated by unilateral or contingent
control.74
72. That is, that yoa < yOgab and that bOba < bOba,.
73. For a formal model of joint control in venture capital contexts in which control is a
continuous variable to be adjusted through different contract provisions, see Andrei A.
Kirilenko, Valuation and Control in Venture Finance, 56 J. FIN. 565 (2001). This model, by
opening up control to a range, moves the formal theory of the firm closer to Kaplan and
Str6mberg's real-world picture. It does not, however, specify any direct connections between
its formal terms and real world institutions.
74. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 486.
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But joint control is not dominated if we change the CTM's
assumptions. Contingent control dominates only because the model
assumes a reliable s. Without a reliable s, the negotiating parties would
have a high-powered incentive to find a way to contract around the
deadlock the model assumes. It comes as no surprise that any number
of such devices show up in real world business planning practice. For
example, VC could contract for a seat on the board of directors." This
ameliorates information asymmetries and imports voice without the
power to direct results - VC can attempt to influence E without
having a power to specify the choice of a. Alternatively, the parties
could contract for fifty-fifty boardroom representation and interpolate
a deadlock breaker, such as arbitration. Since this would be contingent
on their failure to agree, it would not depend on the identification of
an s. Such sharing arrangements are common in the world of contracts
among equity participants in small businesses.76 Although not perfect,
such solutions do amount to a plausible second best given the absence
of a contractible contingency clearly indicating that control should be
vested in E or VC.
With this we return to Kaplan and Stromberg's results and the
practice of shared control in venture capital startups.77 The contracting
pattern suggests an interesting modification of the CTM's setup. As
noted, contracts providing for contingent control transfer to the VC
upon an s specified in advance are a minority. But this point also
confirms the theoretical prediction that contracts in this context will
manifest strategies for dealing with noncontractible subject matter.78
The small number of such provisions bespeaks a judgment that the
available signals are unreliable. It appears that both VC and E prefer
to grapple with unverifiable facts attending 0b states in the black box
of the boardroom.
75. Venture capital transactions include a separate "Investor Rights Agreement"
entered into between the issuer and individual purchasers of preferred. These contracts
customarily include a right to attend board meetings in a nonvoting capacity. See Craig E.
Dauchy, Venture Capital Financings, in DOING DEALS 2000: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS
AND BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE 233, 301 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course
Handbook Series No. 1167,2000).
76. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 69, at §§ 9.0-.38.
77. For a contrasting discussion of shared control arrangements, see Armando Gomes &
Walter Novaes, Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism (SSRN Elec.
Paper Coll. No. 277111, 2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=277111. Gomes and Novaes
model shared control as a governance mechanism for a firm with a dispersed minority
shareholder interest. They hypothesize two blockholders who together control management
decisions but cannot act unilaterally, and they show that in some circumstances such an
arrangement could be superior to either of control by a single blockholder or widely
dispersed shareholding.
78. The practitioner literature shows that this is effected by a shareholder voting
agreement pursuant to which, in the event that performance targets are not met, E promises
to vote for additional directors nominated by VC. Dauchy, supra note 75, at 243.
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During the noncontractible period between t = 0 and t = 2, VC,
instead of waiting for a verifiable signal, takes a noncontrolling
position inside the firm's boardroom. In the boardroom there are
three directors, E, VC, and a neutral third actor selected by both. So
long as the three agree, control is shared. In the event of disagreement
between VC and E, the mutually selected third director holds the
balance of power. By hypothesis, VC and E will compete to influence
the third director. Suppose performance has been mediocre and VC
would like to remove and replace E as CEO. If the third director is
motivated to enhance firm value and VC persuades the third director
that the move is necessary for achievement of an 0, state, E is out. At
the same time, E also has access to the third director and can state a
defense.79
Compare the more limited menu of control transfer devices in the
CTM. There, if no transfer occurs by advance specification but
performance incentives turn out to be dysfunctional, you contract into
the optimal performance state only by means of a Coasian bribe.
Interestingly, this item is always on the real world menu. Nothing
stops a VC in the tripartite shared-control arrangement from making a
similar bribe either to the third director or to E. Nor does anything
stop the third director from initiating this discussion and holding out
for a side payment. But a persuasive substantive pitch to the third
director costs VC less than a bribe. By hypothesis, then, the ideal third
director has a strong reputational interest in being seen as an
impartial, expert maker of good-faith business judgments who pursues
firm value from a neutral stance and is impervious to Coasian bribes.
This lets the firm reach a* without barriers stemming from ex ante
wealth endowments or insufficient expected value of the project in 0b.
For the reputational constraint to work, the third director would have
to be an actor known in a business community common to both E and
VC. Here, as in Gilson and Black's description, the real world pattern
of close geographic proximity between E and VC would be facilitative:
the third director should also live in the neighborhood. Similar
reputational concerns may constrain the VC before forming an
alliance with the third director against E. The VC who engineers too
many E replacements or, worse, abuses its power, can be shut out of
future deals with the best Es. °
79. For a comparison venture capital form, which provides for VC control on a three out
of five basis, see 1 MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC
OFFERING NEGOTIATION § 8-23 (3d ed. 2000).
80. Black & Gilson, supra note 17, at 262-63; Sahlman, supra note 7, at 513; see also
Kirilenko, supra note 73, at 570 (noting that "venture capital firms are greatly differentiated
by reputation").
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4. Implications
The shared control structure's real world dominance over the
alternative of VC control or hardwired control transfers suggests that
Es have significant but not decisive bargaining power, presumably
because VCs compete to finance the most promising entrepreneurs. It
also suggests that an arrangement positioning cooperation in the
shadow of a threatened control transfer has productivity advantages.
Certainly, there is evidence of significant CEO turnover in the venture
capital field."' Thus, to the extent the venture capital interest can be
protected satisfactorily without outright boardroom control, one
would expect shared control to dominate over venture capitalist
control.
A recent story in the business press reinforces this description of
shared control in venture capital portfolio companies. Robert E.
Davoli, a VC with a notable number of wildly successful high
technology investments in the years preceding 2000, also is known for
an aggressive posture respecting the tenure of his Es. He has fired six
of twenty-four in a five-year period. The result is a reputation as an
impatient VC, in contrast to the more passive postures of the "instant"
VCs who, chasing the trend, entered the business in the late 1990s.
This is said to make Davoli a throw back to the heroic days of venture
capital in the 1960s, when pioneers like Arthur Rock and Thomas J.
Perkins took a hands-on role. Meanwhile, Davoli is said to be subject
to a constraint when attacking an E for missing a performance target.
He must first mobilize the board.82
Even as this story describes a world of shared control, it suggests
caution with the foregoing account. First, venture capital
arrangements may have evolved in history, with VC control being the
practice in an early phase and shared control becoming more
prominent as more capital came to pursue fewer deals with a more
sophisticated generation of Es. Second, shared control may mean
different things in different portfolio companies. Many factors can
come to bear when the third director is selected. VC is likely to have
81. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 71, at 176-78, reports turnover in 40 out of 220
venture capital rounds in their data set. M.T. Hannan et al., Inertia and Change in the Early
Years: Employment Relations in Young, High Technology Firms, 5 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 503 (1996), finds that in the first twenty months following a firm's initial round of
venture capital finance, 20% of firms replace E with a nonfounder CEO; the percentage
goes up to 40% after forty months and 80% after eighty months. See also Klausner & Litvak,
supra note 9 (working paper at 6).
82. John A. Byrne, How a VC Does It, Bus. WK., July 24, 2000, at 97. More generally,
"high-reputation VCs tend to replace CEOs more often than low-reputation VCs do."
Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9 (working paper at 6). For a discussion of the problems an E
faces in choosing a VC and a description of a reputational market for VC services, see D.
Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 133 (1998).
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the more extensive network of potential candidates. Information
asymmetries and differentials in bargaining power and skill could
mean that the "independent" third director is highly susceptible to the
influence of the VC (or, as seems less likely, to the influence of E). If
negotiations work systematically to favor VC influence, the real world
of shared control may not be materially dissimilar from that of the
standard picture of VC control.
Consider in this regard a technical point respecting the control
sharing mechanism. As a matter of contract planning, it is never
enough for E and VC to agree to agree on the third director. One must
also provide for the possibility that E and VC might fail to agree on a
candidate.83 Without a deadlock-breaking arrangement at the selection
stage, a board of two can emerge and make costly deadlock a
possibility. The standard close corporation drafting solution is to
provide for the intervention of a neutral arbitrator at this point.' The
legal literature suggests that a low-cost but somewhat arbitrary
alternative approach is utilized in some venture capital deals. Under
this, the charter provides that E's class of stock elects one director,
VCs class of stock elects one director, and the third director is elected
by all the stock, voting as a single class." Assuming that E and VC
each have one vote per share and do not hold exactly the same
number of shares, the result in a case of disagreement is that the
winning third-seat candidate will be nominated by the actor with the
larger absolute number of shares. Absent some other arrangement
constraining the exercise of voting power, this means that in the event
of disagreement, the party with the share voting majority controls all
significant firm decisions. According to Kaplan and Stromberg's
numbers, this contracting solution favors the VC in the majority of
cases.
We have assayed the dynamics of shared control without asking a
fundamental question: Why have shared control in most cases, full VC
control in a significant minority of cases, and full E control in a smaller
minority of cases? What factors distinguish the three classes of
transactions? On a standard agency cost analysis we should expect to
see greater control rights in VC in transactions holding out greater
information asymmetrics and adverse selection problems.86 A line of
83. One also needs to control the size of the board. The practitioner literature contains
an exemplar of a VC-E voting agreement containing a provision requiring unanimous
consent to increase the size of the board. Lawrence B. Low, Venture Capital Agreements, in
NUTS AND BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS: UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF
CAPITAL MARKET AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS 313, 413 (PLI Corp. L. &
Prac., Course Handbook Series No. 1035, 1998).
84. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441
(Del. 1947); O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 69, at §§ 9.0-38.
85. Dauchy, supra note 75, at 316.
86. Malcom P. Baker & Paul A. Gompers, Executive Ownership and Control in Newly
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theoretical economics expands on this point in detail. Thomas
Hellman focuses on bargaining power and productivity variables. He
asks why E would surrender control in the first place, since surrender
of control creates the possibility that at some point after startup VC
will terminate E as CEO and substitute a professional manager.87 If
VC always has all the bargaining power, the question is easily
answered - E has no other way to access capital. But, notes Hellman,
a puzzle arises in a world where Es can access alternative (and more
passive) sources of capital. Alternatively, an E with an attractive-
looking project acquires bargaining power when multiple VCs
compete for the opportunity to participate. In Hellman's model, VC
control is more likely, and replacement of E more frequent, where
professional management substitutes add value, Es tend to be
unproductive, Es derive low private benefits from control, and VCs
have greater bargaining power.' In the alternative, Kirilenko offers an
incomplete contracts model which shows that more control comes to
VC with higher degrees of adverse selection. In this model, as control
is surrendered to VC, E can be expected to take a give back in the
form of more advantageous financial terms.89
II. THE PREFERRED STOCK PROBLEM IN THE VENTURE CAPITAL
CONTEXT
The theoretical case for preferred stock as a financing vehicle for
venture capital, thus described, is robust. But problems inhere in the
legal framework that encases preferred stock. This Part describes
those problems and the contractual solutions that have evolved in the
venture capital context. When we emerge from this discussion, venture
capital preferred will still be in a robust condition. But it will have a
few weaknesses in need of attention.
A. The Preferred Stock Problem
The "preferred stock problem" is wrought into the historical
performance of publicly traded preferred. The classic description of
the problem can be found in Graham and Dodd's treatise on
corporate finance. Graham and Dodd warned value investors against
investment in preferred stock, observing that it did not behave like a
senior security should on all downside scenarios. The dividend
Public Firms: The Role of Venture Capitalists (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 165173, 1999), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=165173.
87. Hellman, supra note 13, at 58.
88. Id. at 60.
89. Kirilenko, supra note 73, at 579-80.
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preference worked well in good times; the liquidation preference
maintained senior status in extreme distress situations. The problem
lay in the middle, with the issuer who found itself struggling to gain or
maintain a position in a hostile product market. The struggling issuer
could cut off periodic payments to the preferred indefinitely, putting it
in the position of a residual interest holder, even as the issuer kept
current its interest and principal payments on subordinated debt.
Avoidance of a bankruptcy filing gave the issuer a powerful incentive
to maintain the cash flows on the debt.' It had no comparable
incentive to keep current on the preferred. Contractual provision for
the cumulation of missed preferred dividends did not correct the
incentive problem. As between allocating a dollar to a preferred
dividend or enhancing the business plan, the struggling issuer always
chose the latter. An overhang of preferred dividend arrearages could
be dealt with later, after a turnaround in the product market. Often
that turnaround never happened.
Even the preferred of the most highly rated issuers failed to pass
inspection in Graham and Dodd's risk-averse framework. Highly rated
preferred, they said, offered only the slightest step up in yield over
comparable subordinated debt. This did not adequately compensate
for the contractual risks.91 The preferred stock form, Graham and
Dodd concluded, was "fundamentally unsatisfactory."92 Anticipating
the CTM, they opined that preferred made sense only under a
contract providing that suspension of the payment stream triggered a
transfer to the preferred of voting control over the firm. But they
entered a caveat here too. Even if the contract provided for voting
control, it was not safe to assume that it would be "intelligently
utilized"93 by a dispersed group of small holders.
Graham and Dodd's negative analysis has proved predictive.
Usage of preferred as a mode of finance by mature firms declined
markedly in the latter part of the twentieth century. Publicly issued
preferred persists in substantial volume only in the capital structures
of firms in regulated industries, such as banks and public utilities. For
these firms, preferred issues make cost sense as a means of satisfying
regulatory mandates to increase the base of equity capital.94
Opinions nonetheless will differ as to whether Graham and Dodd's
blanket disapproval should be taken seriously today. Their depression-
90. BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPALS AND TECHNIQUE
379 (4th ed. 1962).
91. Id. at 382; see also SIDNEY COTFLE ET AL., GRAHAM AND DODD'S SECURITY
ANALYSIS 470-74 (5th ed. 1988).
92. GRAHAM ET AL, supra note 90, at 375.
93. Id. at 381.
94. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 392-93 (6th ed. 2000).
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era risk aversion rings hollow in the context of the risk neutrality of
modern financial economics. Surely, says the contemporary observer,
actors in the capital markets will have devised solutions to any
contracting problems. The contemporary preference for subordinated
debt over preferred should be attributed to the tax system and the
agency cost advantages of debt capitalization95 rather than to any
intrinsic infirmity in the preferred stock form.96 Interest payments are
deductible by the issuer where preferred dividend payments are not,
making debentures the cheaper mode of financing for issuers with
substantial income tax liabilities97 - so much cheaper that the cost
balance tends to tip only in the case of regulated issuers.
Observers schooled in corporate law will be less quick to discard
Graham and Dodd's negative judgment on the preferred stock
contract. The legal track record of publicly issued preferred, viewed
from the investor's point of view, has been as dismal as was the
financial performance of public utility preferred issues in the
depression era.98 To a reader of case law on preferred stock contracts,
Graham and Dodd got it exactly right: absent voting control and a
means of surmounting collective action problems in its exercise,
95. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 323 (1986).
96. Cf. Robert Heinkel & Josef Zechner, The Role of Debt and Preferred Stock as a
Solution to Adverse Investment Incentives, 25 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 1 (1990) (showing
that preferred creates incentives for the firm's common holders to invest, and thus
ameliorates the underinvestment problem that follows from the issuance of debt; a new issue
of preferred counters the agency costs of debt, and thereby not only enhances the firm's debt
capacity but increases the overall value of the firm).
97. VICrOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATION, BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN'S CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 337-38 (4th ed. 1993). Some of this relative
disadvantage is made up by the intercorporate dividend exclusion, under which corporate
holders of preferred can exclude a substantial percentage of dividends received from their
corporate tax bases. I.R.C. §§ 243, 244 (1990). The result is that preferred, particularly if
issued by a high-grade public utility, can offer an attractive opportunity to insurance
companies and other corporate institutional investors. The tax benefit means a lower yield
and cost of capital to the issuer. Donald E. Fischer & Glenn A. Wilt, Non-Convertible
Preferred Stock as a Financing Instrument 1950-1965, 23 J. FIN. 611 (1968). Short-term
floating rate preferred with dividend rates tied to short-term interest rates also makes use of
the intercorporate dividend exclusion. This paper is often issued by banks and sold to
corporations with excess cash available for short-term investment, for which it makes an
attractive alternative to short-term debt instruments.
Another tax dodge also must be noted. In the mid-1990s, investment bankers put the
corporate trust device to use in inventing tax deductible preferred. Here the corporation
raising the capital issues bonds to a special purpose trust. The trust in turn raises the capital
to pay for the bonds by issuing preferred stock to corporate taxpayers. The ultimate credit
on the deal takes an interest deduction while the ultimate sources of capital get the
intercorporate dividend exclusion. By the end of 1997, more than 285 of these issues were
outstanding; they had raised $27 billion. Arun Khanna & John J. McConnell, MIPs, QUIPs
AND TOPrs: Old Wine in New Bottles, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 39 (1998).
98. See Robert M. Blair-Smith & Leonard Helfenstein, A Death Sentence or a New
Lease on Life? A Survey of Corporate Adjustments under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 148, 150-51,162-69 (1946).
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preferred holders are vulnerable to issuer opportunism. In bad times,
they are the victims of opportunistic recapitalizations and one-sided
renegotiations pursuant to which their preference rights are stripped
for the benefit of the common stock. 9 In good times, contractual
legerdemain incident to mergers and acquisitions can lead to the same
results, again transferring value from their pockets to those of the
common stockholders.
Furthermore, preferred's legal position deteriorated markedly
over the course of the twentieth century. Prior to 1940, some of these
opportunistic transactions were held by state courts to violate
constitutional property rights. But that "vested rights" theory of
judicial protection fell out of favor. This can be attributed in part to
the ascendency of realist and collectivist jurisprudence during the New
Deal."° Charter competition also played a role. Delaware has seen
that the interests of the managers who choose states of incorporation
are aligned with the common stockholders against preferred and other
senior security holders and shaped its case law accordingly." 1 Today's
cases hold out no fiduciary or other protective doctrine to substitute
for the defunct vested rights approach. As a result, public preferred
holders have to rely on the literal terms of their contracts to protect
against issuer opportunism. From the evidence of the litigated cases,
the contracts never evolved so as to close all the loopholes and
provide reliable protection. 2
From the legal perspective, then, the eclipse of preferred as a
financing vehicle for mature firms may reflect dysfunctional
contracting in addition to tax disadvantages. Under this view, it is not
safe to assume that the legal framework encasing a given mode of
99. It should be noted that a surrender of rights by a class of preferred in connection
with a distressed issuer's recapitalization is not per se unfair. Sometimes the common stock
has rights too, as where both the preferred and the common have to vote as a class to
approve a charter amendment or merger that will make the firm as a whole more valuable.
In such a case, the common will not support the transaction unless it is allocated a part of the
proceeds. Responsible managers do their best to give the common enough to garner its
support but otherwise respect the rights of the preferred. The classic case is Goldman v.
Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943).
100. See Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, 35 N.E.2d 618, 622 (N.Y. 1941);
NORMAN D. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 573-82 (2d ed. 1971). The legal
landscape surrounding bonds also changed drastically during the course of the twentieth
century. Fiduciary duties to bondholders today are hypothesized by law review
commentators. No significant case supports them. In the 1920s, fiduciary duties to
bondholders were everyday subject matter in litigated cases. See, e.g., Charles H. Haines, Jr.,
Comment, Corporations - Modification Provisions of Corporate Mortgages and Trust
Incentives. 38 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1939).
101. The leading Delaware case is Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del.
1940).
102. ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECrIVE 266 (1976); Victor
Brudney, Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock Modifications, 26
RUTGERS L. REV. 445 (1973); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Problem of Preferred
Stock (And Why We Should Care About It), 51 Bus. LAW. 443 (1996).
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finance has evolved so as to foster first-best contractual risk
allocations."°3 For preferred holders, per Graham and Dodd, the legal
environment makes voting control the sine qua non of adequate
protection. There results a sticking point. Mature issuers will be
unwilling to concede voting control to senior security holders whose
capital contribution amounts to a minority proportion of the firm's
equity base. Unless the contract is carefully drafted to vest the
preferred with critical vetoes, the contract can be unilaterally
amended to remove or modify the preferred's rights to the benefit of
the common."°4 Preferred stock contracts drafted with the degree of
precision necessary to assure 100% protection against such ex post
stripping of value have been the exception and not the rule. A species
of bargaining impasse results - an impasse making the publicly issued
preferred of a mature firm unlikely to carry an advantageous price
when compared to a subordinated debenture.
The subsections that follow describe the preferred stock problem
in greater detail. The discussion picks up the contracting pattern
described in Part I, distinguishing injuries that stem from the absence
of control of the boardroom from injuries that stem from the absence
of a majority of the votes at shareholders' meetings. Section B will
return to venture capital preferred to gauge the degree of success VCs
have had in solving the problems.
1. Control in the Boardroom
Recall that in the CTM, the firm's central governance problem
concerns the allocation of the power to select a maximizing course of
action a* given suboptimal incentives on the part of the holders of the
firm's common equity. In practice, whether such a critical choice
implicates investment policy, dividend policy, the decision to sell or
liquidate the firm, or amendment of the firm's charter, the legally
constituted governance structure of the corporation vests the power to
make the decision in the boardroom. In some cases, as with mergers
(and asset sell-outs), liquidations, and charter amendments, approval
of the shareholders also must be bestowed at a second stage. But the
board still controls the agenda and acts as the first-stage gatekeeper.
So, to return to the problem described by Graham and Dodd, when an
issue of preferred loses value because it pays no dividends at a time
103. For expositions of this view, see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of
Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997), and Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate
Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
104. A promise to pay can be inserted into the preferred stock contract in addition to
dividend priority. The promise is not of the same order, however, as the promise to pay debt.
Since dividends cannot be paid where debt is outstanding in distress situations, the promise
is inherently conditional.
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when the firm possesses free cash flow, the problem presupposes that
the preferred lack control or influence in the boardroom.
a. Vulnerability: Preferred Absent Control or Shared Control. The
facts of Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams,"°5 the leading case
deciding a dispute respecting preferred stock issued to a venture
capital investor, provide a more particular description of the problem.
This sad story starts in the portfolio company's fifth year. Called
Genta Inc., it had successfully completed startup and gone public. At
the time of its IPO, Genta sold a second round batch of preferred, $30
million worth, to a group of venture capitalists (VC). The preferred
was at the weak end of the contract protection range - VC neither
controlled nor shared control in the boardroom and did not hold a
voting majority of the shares."°
Genta needed the capital to operationalize a cluster of intellectual
property rights in genetic research. Three years later, in mid-1996,
nothing operational had come up. A second operating division of the
company was at work on an application but had yet to produce a
positive cash flow. A third division had a small biopharmaceutical
manufacturing operation with a positive cash flow. Despite these
efforts, Genta was running out of cash. Indeed, the company as a
whole had consumed $100 million over eight years without returning a
dollar. Dr. Thomas Adams (the E) was the CEO.
E was determined to stay in control and buy more time. Since VC
had refused to invest further capital, investment bankers were hired to
scare up new financing, equity or debt. Meanwhile, VC pressured E
and his board of directors to sell off the firm's assets and distribute the
lion's share of the proceeds to it. E resisted. Unfortunately for VC, its
contracts gave it no rights with which to force the issue. Genta had a
near-term duty to redeem the preferred, but Genta could satisfy the
duty with either cash or common stock. Since Genta had no cash, the
redemption had to be in stock. Genta's problem was that as the
redemption date approached, Nasdaq was initiating delisting
proceedings because Genta no longer met minimum standards.
Meanwhile, delisting was classified in the preferred stock contract as a
"fundamental change" that triggered a cash redemption right. This put
E in a race against the clock. He had to find new financing and
stabilize the firm's cash flow position before Nasdaq delisted the
common stock, triggering the cash redemption.107 Since there was no
way to finance a cash redemption, triggering meant a defensive
105. 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997).
106. Id. at 1043-44.
107. Id. at 1045-52.
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bankruptcy filing to prevent the preferred from executing a judgment
against all of the assets of the company. °8
E and Genta managed to win the race by a nose, stalling Nasdaq
by begging for more time even as they closed a desperation financing
with a firm called Aries, run by a Dr. Rosenwald. In exchange for a $3
million loan, secured by Genta's assets, Genta gave Aries control of
the board along with a fistful of warrants and conversion rights that
carried majority voting control of the firm. Aries promised to use its
best efforts to raise more capital; if it did not raise another $3.5 million
in six months, it would lose its right to nominate a majority of the
Genta board. E's continued status was not clear. Apparently, Aries
could designate its own CEO. VC protested the deal, offering to
advance a slightly larger amount of cash on the same terms. The
Genta board refused the offer. Its contract having failed it, VC
decided to seek judicial protection in Delaware, Genta's state of
incorporation."9
For VC to have to go to court was to admit contract failure. Yet
VC's contract followed the overall pattern predicted by the CTM -
having repayment of the senior security come due in the event of 0,.
Here, by implication, a*Ob was not a new business plan for the going
concern but the sale on a going concern basis of the firm's producing
assets. More than crumbs off the table were at stake: Genta had one
profitable division; Aries saw realizable assets worth at least $3
million. Unfortunately, the delay in triggering the cash redemption
right engineered by E had a disastrous impact on the value of VC's
interest. While VC sat on its hands waiting for Nasdaq, the closing of
the Aries loan gave Aries a priority interest to the proceeds of a
liquidation of the producing assets. In the terms of the CTM, the
contingent control transfer provision in this venture capital contract
relied on an s - Nasdaq delisting - that was manipulable in addition
to being observable and verifiable. The delay in triggering put VC in
the position Eastern Airlines' bondholders had experienced a decade
earlier - watching the transfer of their collateral to parties providing
new capital as the firm's insiders speculated on a low-probability
turnaround.
Any number of contracting strategies could have averted this
problem. For example, an old-fashioned business covenant prohibiting
the incurrence of new debt and triggering a cash redemption right
would have chilled the Aries deal. In the alternative, the drafter might
have expanded the menu of redemption triggers, keying the additional
entries to negative information generated by Genta, such as cash flow
or other financial measures or production targets. This returns us to
108. Id. at 1044 n.6.
109. Id. at 1050-52.
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the problem of identifying an appropriate s. Like the CTM's s, real
world proxies tend to be imperfect. Indeed, as recent events
surrounding the Enron bankruptcy have reminded us, many
accounting figures used as contracting signals are manipulable. The
solution to that problem lies in the provision of a long menu of
triggers. But this can present its own operational problems, for triggers
can go off too early or too late. Of course, an early triggering invites
waiver by VC and attendant renegotiation. But to the extent E has
bargaining power, the waiver argument will not be ex ante persuasive.
In sum, the evolution of an effective set of triggers can take experience
across generations of contracts. Meanwhile, an outside, noncontrolling
VC is always better off with than without one.
In the alternative, the preferred stock contract might have granted
VC control of the board of directors or a seat on the board with a
chance to influence a neutral outside director. As we have seen, most
venture capital contracts do bestow one or the other. With VC in
charge in the boardroom, Genta would have been steered toward
orderly liquidation, no last-ditch financing would have been in the
works, and no one would have bothered to delay Nasdaq delisting.
With board control, investment and dividend policy no longer presents
a problem from preferred's point of view. In some situations the VC
control solution will be problematic from an efficiency point of view,
of course - this is a fundamental insight of the CTM. How likely is
VC control to mean inefficient choices? Certainly, in this context the
debt-like characteristics of preferred participation should not
contribute to this risk of suboptimal decisionmaking by causing the
preferred to err on the side of risk aversion in framing an investment
plan. If we put E's private benefits to one side, the conversion
privilege aligns the long-term interests of the preferred and common
in 0g states. Interests diverge in 0b states, where, as in Adams, VC will
be ready to give up and liquidate earlier than will E. Here both the
CTM and the facts in Adams suggest that VC control in 0, states is
likely to be a superior arrangement.
b. Legal Framework. Equity-Linked Investors v. Adams provides a
good example of the judicial treatment accorded to preferred claims.
The regime of judicial enforcement bears directly on the burden facing
the drafter of the preferred stock contract. Unless courts provide a
protective backstop against opportunistic transfers of value and
stripping of rights, any contract package falling short of giving the
preferred outright boardroom control implies a risk of opportunism
unless its drafter manages to specify all salient contingencies.
Unfortunately, Delaware law holds out no serious promise of
fiduciary protection against issuer opportunism for preferred
stockholders. Under Delaware law, the preferred share the role of
fiduciary beneficiary with the common only with respect to elements
of preferred participation constituting an equity participation identical
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to that of the common. Accordingly, the preferred have a cause of
action along with the common where management engages in self-
dealing transactions or negligently mismanages the firm. In contrast,
where a preferred claim arises from rights and preferences not shared
with the common, the Delaware courts characterize the claim as
contractual rather than fiduciary.' They then read the contract
narrowly."'
Accordingly, counsel for VC in Adams needed to construct a claim
that did not derive from the liquidation preference and instead went to
the stock's core equity participation. It cleverly did this by making
reference to the Delaware fiduciary rules constraining management
defensive tactics against hostile takeovers. More particularly, it
attacked the Aries deal as sale of control within Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,12 presenting VC in the capacity
of an equityholder (rather than in the capacity of a senior
securityholder), protesting management's failure to act to maximize
the value of the firm in connection with a control transfer. If the deal
was within Revlon, the VC argued, then the Genta board had a duty to
maximize the value received in exchange for the control transfer. By
refusing VC's better offer, it breached the duty.
The Delaware Chancery court rejected the theory, despite a
significant counterfactual acknowledgment. It admitted that in an
open auction for the company held at the time of the Aries deal, VC's
interest in accessing the proceeds of liquidation would have caused its
bid to be the highest:
Assume, for example, that the present value of the firm's prospects as a
going concern would be only $9 million (net), which is also its liquidation
value. Assume that in an open bidding contest, a well informed bidder
will offer the company something less than 3 million for a 51% interest
(i.e., $9mm + $3mm = $12mm divided by 2 = $6mm; but since in
liquidation the common stock would be worthless, the bidder would be
unlikely to bid the maximum $6mm value on these assumptions).
Assume such a $3mm bid would permit the common stock some further
opportunity to see a payoff in the company labs and in the marketplace.
Now assume that a bidding contest occurs in which the preferred takes
part. What will probably happen? The preferred's aim might be simply to
liquidate the company and take all of the net proceeds and apply it to its
preference. This will prevent its exploitation by the common and cut its
110. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986); Dalton v.
Am. Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1985).
111. Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392 (Del. 1996) (refusing to resort
to extrinsic evidence in interpreting preferred stock contract and instead employing the
maxim of interpretation contra proferentum); Warner Communications Inc. v. Cris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 83 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989) (interpreting language literally protecting preferred
stockholders against them).
112. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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losses. To accomplish that goal, the preferred could easily pay in an
auction up to $21 million ($30 million liquidation preference minus
present net liquidation value) because that amount would go into the
company's treasury but could be immediately restored to the preferred
when it exercised its voting power to cause the liquidation of the firm.
3
But the competitive bidding scenario did not determine the result in
the court's fiduciary analysis. The question for purposes of fiduciary
law, it reasoned, was not whether the board of directors had
maximized the value of the assets or of the firm. The fiduciary regime
addressed only the board's good faith in pursuit of value for the
common stock interest:
What is clear is that the Genta board was striving to maximize the
possibility of the common stock participating in some "upside" benefit
from the commercial development of the company's intellectual
properties. It is clear too that the course it took to do that arguably was
superior to an alternative in which the preferred acquired control,
because the preferred had a financial incentive to liquidate the firm
immediately, thus depriving the common of any current value. Thus,
unlike two competing cash transactions or transaction in which widely
traded securities are offered, the alternatives that plaintiff poses are rich
with legitimate, indeed unavoidable, occasions for the exercise of good
faith business judgment.
[This is not] a situation in which, from the common stock's perspective,
"there is no tomorrow," and the board ought not be recognized as having
discretion to prefer what it sees as a "longer term value" over a higher
present value. The court would have no basis to conclude that the
immediate value of the common would in fact be greater had an
alternative of the kind presented by the preferred somehow been put in
place.... 114
In effect, the Delaware court here declined to use fiduciary law as
the basis for implying a maximizing control transfer mechanism. In so
doing it acted in accord with the structure of American fiduciary law.
The law's charge to the corporate board to work diligently and loyally
to enhance value is phrased in terms of the overall "firm" only in
general articulations115 or in cases where the effect is to strengthen
management's hand against a hostile tender offer for the common
113. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1997).
114. Id. at 1058-59.
115. See, e.g., ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994).
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stock."6 Where board decisions implicate conflicting interests of
classes of equity securities (or conflicting interests of debt and equity
securities), and management acts to advance the interests of the
common stockholders, the value to be maximized becomes the value
of the common stock.
This alignment between fiduciary obligation and the common
stock's interest reflects first-generation agency theory, which held that
the residual interest holder has the value-maximizing incentive in all
going-concern situations outside the vicinity of insolvency. 7 The
CTM's primary lesson for the law is that this assumption is not nearly
as safe as the corporate law literature seems to think. 8
The legal primacy of the common stock interest also reflects
institutional concerns. In a hypothetical alternative regime, the board
is charged with maximizing firm value whatever the allocational
consequences among classes of securityholders."l9  Information
asymmetries between the boardroom and the courtroom make
intervention to enforce such an open-ended maximization duty
impracticable. Courts do not have the technical wherewithal to review
corporate boards on the substance of their business decisions. They
prefer to limit inspection to process contexts, which implicate facts and
factors more immediately intelligible and amenable to judicial
review. 2° The courts also accord the board a wide zone of discretion in
which to resolve pie-slicing disputes among different classes of
securityholder. For example, had the Genta board decided in good
faith and upon due diligence that the game was up - that the Aries
deal was one-sided and unlikely to lead to a turnaround and to put the
firm to the preferred in accord with their contract - the common
116. The reference is to corporate law's constituency statutes. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-756(d) (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (West Supp. 2001); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001-02).
117. Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV.
23 (1991). Distress situations are the exception. There the equity has a number of perverse
incentives that can lead to reduction in the value of the firm's producing assets. See Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Co., 1991 WL 277613, at *33 &
n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
118. For a contrasting economic approach to the same endpoint, see Thomas A. Smith,
The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98
MICH. L. REV. 214 (1999).
119. Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205 (1998);
Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW 413 (1986).
120. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1993), where the Delaware Supreme Court moves Revlon review away from business
substance in the direction of process review. Under QVC the question is less whether the
board maximizes value than whether the board informed itself of available alternative
courses of action respecting value maximization.
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stockholders would have been hard pressed to articulate an action for
breach of fiduciary duty.1
21
The foregoing justification of the ruling in Equity-Linked
Investors, L.P. v. Adams, however, leaves open some problems. Since
Genta was in distress, governance in the common's interest was not
presumptively efficient. Furthermore, the court could have ruled for
the preferred without instituting an unworkable fiduciary regime.
Genta's delaying actions respecting Nasdaq delisting easily could have
been characterized as a breach of the contractual duty to act in good
faith. The contract accorded the preferred a right of redemption in the
event of delisting; but for the board's intervention with Nasdaq, the
delisting would have occurred, perfecting the right.12 Since the action
frustrated the exercise of the right, it arguably violated the contract
law good faith duty in its narrower articulation, under which the duty
protects performance of the contract's explicit terms only and
implicates no broad, fiduciary-like duty of self-abnegation. The
foregoing characterization of the Adams situation is well within the
narrow statement of the duty, a formulation held applicable to senior
securities in Delaware cases. 123
It should be emphasized that the good faith rule referenced here is
a special rule that applies only to debt and preferred stock contracts. It
bears only the most tenuous familial relationship with the duty of good
faith described in the Restatement 2d and taught in first year courses.
The Restatement's good faith standard invites aggressive application to
protect contract parties in positions of disadvantage. It constrains
opportunism to protect expectations. A variant of this standard
applies when an interpreting judge concludes that the contract
contains no term dictating a result on the facts of the case. In such an
"omitted term" case, the decisionmaker is invited to interpolate a term
following from community standards of fairness. Once again
aggressive intervention is invited.25 Two decades ago, plaintiffs invited
courts to apply these precepts aggressively to protect holders of bonds
and preferred stock. Instead, beginning with the famous case of Broad
121. Compare Orban v. Field, 1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997), a venture capital
case in which the court sustains the board's action to wipe out a common stockholder in
favor of preferred classes holding a majority of the votes.
122. Had the Genta board taken no steps to delay, delisting would have occurred in
early December 1996. 705 A.2d 1040, 1047 (1997). Delaying tactics caused delisting to be
delayed until February 4, 1997; the Genta board approved the Aries deal on January 28,
1997. Id. at 1051-52 & n.34.
123. Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785 (Del. Ch. 1987); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d
873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
125. Id. § 204 cmt. d.
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v. Rockwell International,126 the courts invented a restrictive variant,
pursuant to which the good faith duty is not breached unless an
articulated contract right has been violated. In most situations, this
bond and preferred good faith rule negates the Restatement's good
faith regime. Good faith is a backstop duty intended to come to bear
to protect parties who do not have specific contract provisions to
protect them. In the vast majority of cases, to require a contract term
first is to say "no good faith duty." But there remains a subset of cases
in which the bond and preferred good faith variant assists a victim of
opportunism. Adams is in this subset.127
Unfortunately for VC this is a small subset. The drafting burden on
preferred remains so onerous as to make the little good faith
protection held out in the cases more theoretical than real. The judges
enforcing the terms of preferred stock contracts give the benefit of any
doubts to the common. Part of the burden stems from the fact that in
Delaware corporate politics often matter more than statements of
doctrine. Corporate politics have not historically favored preferred
claims because managers, who decide where to charter the firm, tend
to be the actors with political influence. Accordingly, contingencies
must be predicted with prescience and provided for in painstaking
detail if the preferred's expectations are not to be frustrated.
Is this an efficient approach? The law of preferred stock thereby
tracks the law and economics that refuses implied-in-fact and implied-
in-law protections to corporate participants on the ground that in the
long run forcing them to negotiate contracts leads to efficient results.
But, as we have seen,28 this rationale is questionable. The complete
contingent claims contract that the law thus demands as a vehicle for
protecting preferred in the absence of boardroom control arguably is
an economic impossibility. Preferred stock contracts traverse a
considerable expanse of noncontractible territory. Of course, we also
have seen that noncontractibility is not an absolute - the CTM, for
example, designs a contract term that indirectly steers the parties
toward an optimal solution of a noncontractible problem. But this also
is exactly what the parties did in Adams, drafting a redemption
provision based on Nasdaq delisting. It is true that VC in Adams could
have extracted a further explicit provision, one to the effect that E
would not actively seek to delay Nasdaq delisting. At this point,
however, the forced contracting norm arguably has led us to an absurd
126. 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); see
also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
127. For a second example, see HB Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp., 1993
WL 257422 (Del. Ch. Jul. 1, 1993) (showing that antidilution provisions governing an issue of
convertible preferred can fail on some fact patterns, requiring intervention under the good
faith rule).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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result. After all, there is no such thing as a case where the drafter of a
specific contract term could not have been even more specific.
The resulting message is disturbing: contractual specifications
designed to protect preferred are intrinsically unreliable because
reviewing courts welcome the opening of loopholes on behalf of the
common stock. But for VC the upshot is clear: the only reliable
contracting course is to take boardroom control, full or shared. Such a
narrowing of the menu of meaningful contractual choices cannot
possibly be efficient.
2. Control at the Shareholders' Meeting
In the usual corporate power allocation, the board of directors
manages the business and the shareholders elect the board. 129
Shareholder approval also is needed for charter amendments, many
mergers, sales of all or substantially all assets, and liquidations. 3°
Preferred stockholders also run into difficulties with respect to
exercises of this shareholder legislative function.
To see why, consider a stylized retelling of the facts of Bove v.
Community Hotel Corp.3 This case concerned a corporation with an
issue of preferred on which no dividends had been paid for twenty-
four years. The face amount of cumulated dividend arrearages was
greater than the going concern value of the entire equity of the firm.
The board of directors determined to eliminate the arrearages,
ostensibly to make the firm a more attractive vehicle for debt
financing.
During the first half of the twentieth century, boards in this
position effected elimination of accumulated arrearages by
engineering direct amendments of their firms' charters. A conceptual
anomaly made this possible. The "preferred stock contract," unlike a
contract governing corporate debt, is a part of the firm's charter. The
charter, in turn, is subject to a statutory process directive respecting
the power to amend. In the early twentieth century, most state
corporate codes provided that a simple majority vote of all
outstanding shares was sufficient to approve a charter amendment.
Literally applied, this meant that where (a) an issue of preferred stock
did not carry a majority of the votes of all issues of stock, and (b) the
preferred issue had been created without a special charter term
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242,251,271,275 (2001).
131. 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969). In the actual case, direct amendment of the preferred stock
contract required a 100% approval by the preferred and the merger required a class vote of
the preferred. The retelling in the text substitutes the scenario that would have followed
under today's Delaware statute. For a more recent example, see Elliott Assocs., L.P. v.
Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843 (Del. 1998).
March 2002]
HeinOnline -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 935 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
requiring a separate vote of the preferred as a class to approve charter
amendments implicating its interests, the rights and preferences of the
preferred were subject to ex post stripping for the benefit of the
common through use of its charter amendment power. This was seen
as unfair, and many state courts invalidated such actions on a
constitutional property rights theory. But that judicial theory became
moribund.'32
In response, state legislatures adjusted state corporate codes,
including Delaware's, so as to afford the preferred a process
protection. A majority vote of a given class of stockholders would be
required whenever a charter amendment impaired that classes'
contract rights.'33 The preferred issuer in Bove, however, found a way
to avoid that preferred class vote. Its board set up a shell, wholly
owned subsidiary and engineered the merger of the issuer corporation
into the shell subsidiary. Under the "merger agreement" between the
two corporations, the common stock of the surviving corporation
would be issued to both the common and the preferred of the issuer
firm in proportions therein specified. Under the specification, the
underwater common came away with a slice of firm value. The
"merger agreement" thus had the effect of stripping value from the
rights of the preferred specified in the charter. Here the managers in
Bove exploited a second legal anomaly: in a merger the charter of the
transferor corporation is replaced by the charter of the surviving
corporation. A merger, accordingly, is a charter-amending event.
The merger in Bove had to be submitted for shareholder approval.
But the state code required a class vote of the preferred in the case of
a charter amendment injurious to the preferred, but required only a
vote of all the shareholders as one class for a merger. In effect, the sole
purpose of the merger into the shell subsidiary was to provide a
vehicle for recapitalizing the firm's equity and eliminating the
preferred arrearages without a class vote of the preferred being
required. Yet the state court sustained the merger. That the merger
was engineered solely for the purpose of eliminating the arrearages
and that the statute provided for a class vote (and veto) in its
instructions respecting the direct means to the end was neither here
nor there. Under corporate law's "doctrine of independent legal
significance," first articulated in Delaware in a similar case, different
sections of the corporate code are to be read literally and
independently. A policy implication of one section does not provide a
court a basis for implying a limitation on the utilization of another
section. Accordingly, the provision for a class vote on changes
132. See supra text accompanying note 100.
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2001). Even with a class vote, publicly traded
preferred has been known to approve right-stripping amendments. See, e.g., Bowman v.
Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753 (I11. 1959).
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injurious to the preferred's interest in the charter amendment section
of the code does not imply a general rule that preferred may in no
circumstances have its rights stripped absent a class vote. As a result,
the merger section may be used to strip preferences from preferred
because it literally does not provide for class vote even though
preference stripping was the only purpose of the merger.
In general, state corporate codes are not interpreted to possess
policy coherence. No embarrassment stems from the resulting
interpretive anomalies. Instead, they are celebrated because they lend
freedom of action to insiders.
Once again, the message for preferred holders is get a better
contract. And indeed, preferred can contract around the Bove
problem with a provision in the charter for a class vote in connection
with mergers." But such provisions are rare in charter provisions
governing publicly issued preferred. A study conducted in the late
1980s of charters governing preferred issued by Delaware
corporations and listed on the New York Stock Exchange found that
only 14% required a class vote in respect of a merger.135 Many issuers
have taken advantage of this failure to draft carefully, successfully
structuring mergers that transfer value from the preferred to the
common.
The Delaware courts have supported the issuers and their value
transfers. They ruled in the touchstone case of Rothschild v. Liggett
that preferred can be cashed out in a merger for substantially less than
its liquidation preference, a "merger" not being "liquidation" even
where the particular class of stock is being cashed out in the merger.136
Elsewhere, Delaware has sanctioned a merger where the managers of
the transferor firm bargained down the consideration first offered for
the preferred by the acquiring firm even as they bargained up the
consideration on offer for the common.37 Finally, in Delaware the
exercise of drafting a charter that actually provides for a class vote in a
merger has proved to be a game played by secret rules. In Warner
Communications Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,138 the court held
that a provision requiring a two-thirds class vote to alter any
preferences, rights, powers or privileges of the preferred did not
operate in respect of a merger, even though the charter had a separate
134. Some states, such as New York, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903(a)(2)(B) (McKinney
Supp. 2002), provide for a class vote. Delaware does not. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251
(2001).
135. Note, Arrearage Elimination and the Preferred Stock Contract: A Survey and a
Proposal for Reform, 9 CARDOzO L. REV. 1335 (1988).
136. Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group, 474 A.2d 133 (Del. 1984).
137. Dalton v. Am. Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1985).
138. 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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provision requiring a two-thirds class vote in respect of charter
amendments.139
Preferred stockholders face a uniquely hostile interpretive
environment. The charter competition phenomenon helps explain this
atmosphere. Delaware's much vaunted responsiveness"4° extends
primarily to the corporate actors who make the decision respecting the
state of incorporation. With publicly traded firms, those actors are the
managers acting as agents for the common stock. When senior-junior
securityholder interests conflict, the managers' interest usually lies
with the juniors. As a result, the Delaware courts have for decades
been ratifying senior-to-junior wealth transfers.
One might predict movement away from this blood sport
respecting senior securities toward a more even-handed mediation
respecting venture capital. In the world of corporate law as product,
venture capital could amount to a submarket. VCs are repeat players
in a position to contest and indeed to direct the startups' choice of
state of incorporation. Should a number of venture capital firms
experience bad results in Delaware litigation, Delaware could suffer a
negative reputational effect in the venture capital community. Of
course, Delaware has run into reputational problems in the past.'41 It
has retained its market share despite these moments of friction
because substantial costs and risks of entry inhibit the appearance of a
state plausibly competing for the charters of large, mature firms.'42
Entry might be easier for a competitor tailoring a legal regime for a
venture capital submarket. On this analysis, the cavalier attitude
displayed to the interests of VC in Equity-Linked Investors v. Adams
is surprising. But Delaware lawmakers are famous for trimming their
sails upon becoming aware that actors in the capital markets
disapprove of a ruling. We have already seen a gesture of solicitude to
VCs holding Delaware preferred.' 43 We very well may see more.
139. It should be noted that Delaware has since ruled that a provision for a class vote
respecting "amendment... by merger" did apply to a merger. But it did so only after the
case was litigated to the state's supreme court. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715
A.2d 843 (Del. 1998).
140. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 37-44 (1993).
141. The most famous case is the Delaware Supreme Court's sudden expansion of the
duty of care to cover board approval of an arm's length merger in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 873-81 (Del. 1985). Insurance premiums rose substantially as a result and the
legislature amended the Code to permit firms to opt out of the duty of care by charter
amendment. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
142. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition,
Regulatory Capture and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1894-95 (1995).
143. See Telcom-SNI Investors, L.L.C. v. Sorrento Networks, Inc., No. Civ. A. 19038-
NC, 2001 WL 1117505 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2001) (enjoining an E from violating a debt
covenant and a provision requiring a preferred class vote to approve a new, prior, or equal
class of preferred, holding that the contract meant what it said).
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Meanwhile, a preferred stockholder who does not control the
board or possess a majority of the voting shares needs a carefully
drafted, triple-riveted set of charter terms. Having gotten that, it will
still need the best lawyer in town should any problems arise.
B. Venture Capital Contracting Practice
The preferred stock problem tends to arise on the intermediate
downside - the issuer performs poorly but not so poorly as to trigger
a bankruptcy filing. This particular stretch of downside territory
occupies a relatively short segment on the range of contingencies
addressed by venture capital contracts. Here wealth allocations,
incentives, and decisionmaking power on 69 scenarios are the primary
contracting concern. These are addressed in the first instance by the
terms of the conversion privilege attached to the preferred and the
provision of registration rights facilitating later exit via the public
trading markets.' Concerns about the E's incentives also loom large
on the upside. These are addressed by allocating E's equity interest in
the firm's growth in the form of stock options that vest over time,
diminishing any temptation to abandon the project prior to the IPO
phase and, in the vast majority of cases where E does not have full
boardroom control, importing a high-powered incentive to remain in
the good graces of VC and the outside director or directors.'45
Provision for mandatory conversion of venture capital preferred in the
event of a qualifying IPO also aligns incentives by constraining the
form of VC's upside payoff47 and, in cases where VC has shared
voting control, by opening a path to an upside control transfer to E.
More generally, the contract's primary job is to align incentives toward
success and provide for gain sharing and eventual access to liquidity
for VC.
Venture capital contracts treat the deepest downside scenarios by
shaping priorities. A startup firm creating no value and running out of
capital goes into bankruptcy, probably to be liquidated once there.
This risk is intrinsic to venture capital investment. Venture capital
144. See Black & Gilson, supra note 17, at 260-61, 264; Edward B. Rock, Greenhorns,
Yankees and Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital, lPOs, Foreign Firms & U.S. Markets, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN LAW 711 (2001). For a theoretical model showing how the
conversion feature aligns the incentives of the entrepreneur with those of the venture
capitalist, see Francesca Cornelli & Oved Yasha, Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible
Debt (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 48581, 1997), at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=48581.
145. See Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 12 (working paper at 30 & n.10); see also
Oliver Hart & John Moore, A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,
109 Q.J. ECON. 841 (1994).
146. The IPO must pass quality tests keyed to the stock price, the amount of proceeds or
the resulting market capitalization. Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 12 (working paper at
21).
147. Black & Gilson, supra note 17, at 261.
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firms moderate it by staging E's draw downs of capital,148 by
diversifying their portfolios of investments in startup firms, by
syndicating investments in particular firms, and by closely monitoring
their positions.'49 When a particular investment does turn out to be a
complete failure, the contract structures priorities to allocate any
crumbs left on the table to VC."5° But these often do not amount to
much.
Suboptimal or mediocre performance short of complete failure
presents a less tractable problem, although not so much so with
venture capital portfolio companies as with mature preferred issuers.
With startup firms, indifferent results can lead directly to the disaster
scenario. Outside capital is needed for survival and poor results mean
that capital is cut off, given staged investment. In contrast, poorly
performing mature firms can survive for years, with the option of
omitting to pay dividends on preferred being a factor assisting in that
survival. There are also drastic differences in duration between senior
securities issued by mature firms and venture capital preferred. The
preferred that concerned Graham and Dodd was issued in the early
and mid-twentieth century, before the inflation of the 1960s and 1970s.
In those days, preferred stocks often had no mandatory redemption
schedule and thus, like common, had an indefinite duration.' Venture
capital preferred tends to take an intermediate term, with a duration
of four to six years.' When the time is up, redemption rights become
exercisable, and the mediocre performer still limping along either
finds replacement capital or becomes a disaster case.
Mediocrity between startup and year five is a problem less easily
treated through advance specification. When value lies on the table
unmaximized, by definition a governance problem exists, although not
necessarily a verifiable one. As we have seen, the solution turns on
intervention by VC to replace E as CEO, and venture capital contracts
in most cases deal with this problem either by vesting boardroom
control in VC, or by making sure that boardroom control remains
contestable. Given the latter situation, and a neutral outside director
with a deciding vote, opportunistic stripping of preferred rights and
preferences seems unlikely. Even if such a resolution passes in the
boardroom, the VC is safe so long as it possesses voting control at
shareholders' meetings. Kaplan and Stromberg's numbers on voting
control thus show us that the preferred stock problem is solved in
148. Sahlman, supra note 7, at 507.
149. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 71, at 139-202.
150. Some venture capital firms have members who specialize in this downside cleanup
function. I owe this point to Professor Marcus Cole.
151. Morey McDaniel, Sinking Fund Preferred Stock, 13 FIN. MGT. 45-52 (Spring 1984).
152. Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 12.
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70.8% of cases with no vesting of E equity and 55.8% with full vesting.
Since the preferred stock problem tends to arise in 0b states and
vesting is unlikely to be full in those states, stripping of VC
preferences and other downside opportunism turns out to be a
possibility in about one-third of the cases. But it also should be noted
that mergers and acquisitions occur in 0g states as well. So the
possibility of stripping still exists in the 45% of full vesting cases where
VC does not have voting control.
To what extent are these minority-vote VCs threatened by
opportunism from majority vote Es due to their status as preferred
holders? The primary limitations on exposure are built into the
transactions' overall economic structure. These deals have a limited,
intermediate term, with E being required to raise cash to redeem the
preferred in 0b states. Prior to liquidation, boardroom control remains
contestable in 58% of the cases where the VC does not have voting
control. So the window for opportunism opens in only a minority of
cases and stays open for only a short period. Of course, Adams shows
how a majority-vote E can strip value even during this short period.
The degree to which value and rights can be stripped in this
minority of cases depends on fine points of contracting practice. The
literature shows that standard venture capital preferred contracts
provide for class votes in respect of adverse charter amendments,
increases in the number of authorized shares, and the authorization of
preferred classes of higher priority.153 Mergers are treated separately
under a one-size-fits-all term. A merger is treated as a liquidation,
triggering a right to redeem the preferred if the "stockholders of the
Company immediately prior to [closing of the transaction] own less
than 50% of the Company's voting power" thereafter. If the merger is
treated as a liquidation, a class vote also is provided for. If the merger
is not treated as a liquidation, no class vote is provided for.154
This one-size-fits-all term is substantially effective, even as it falls a
step short of perfection. The term manifestly is designed to overrule
Rothschild v. Liggett's ruling that a cash-out merger is not a
liquidation.155 Where all of the shares of the transferor firm in the
merger are cashed out, the term manifestly achieves its intended
purpose. The preferred liquidation rights become immediately
153. See Dauchy, supra note 75, at 315; see also Hank Barry, Negotiating Preliminary
Financing, in 20TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 849, 860 (PLI Patents,
Copyright, Trademarks, and Literary Property, Course Handbook Series No. 590, 2000).
154. Ellen B. Corenswet et al., Venture Capital Considerations in Mergers and
Acquisitions, in HANDLING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN HIGH-TECH AND EMERGING
GROWTH ENVIRONMENTS 1999, at 655, 661-62 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook
Series No. 1122, 1999); Dauchy, supra note 75, at 317; Richard R. Plumridge, Typical
Venture Capital Transaction Documents, in PRIVATE PLACEMENTS 2001, at 817, 856-57 (PLI
Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. 1239, 2001).
155. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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exercisable, and the preferred gets a class vote that allows it to veto
the merger. But the preferred with a minority of the overall shares will
not be protected under this provision in all cases. Here are three
examples.
(a) X Co. has 6,000 shares of common outstanding held by E
amounting to 60% of its total shares (6,000 total); 4,000 shares (40%)
of preferred are held by VC. The liquidation value of the preferred is
$100 (or $400,000). X Co.'s total value is $500,000. Acquiring firm A
Co., which is controlled by the third director of X Co., organizes a
shell acquisition subsidiary, A Sub, which issues to A Co. 5,000
common shares. A Sub merges into X Co. pursuant to a merger
agreement providing that 5,000 of the 6,000 X Co. common shares are
to be converted into $40 cash. The other 1,000 X Co. common shares
are left to ride, as are the preferred shares. The shares of A Sub are
converted into 5,000 common shares of X Co. Simultaneously with the
closing of the merger, X Co. borrows the $200,000 to be paid to its
common stock in the merger, giving the lender a note and mortgage
on X Co.'s property. A Co. also takes a long-term option to buy the
remaining 1,000 shares of X Co. for $20.
In this deal, when the shooting stops, the acquirer has bought
exactly 50% of the target common, thereby avoiding triggering
liquidation. The preferred has no incentive to convert to common
prior to the closing since the value of the X Co. into which it would
convert is less than its liquidation preference. The preferred is better
off holding to maturity. A Co. is doing a leveraged speculation on an
increase in X Co.'s equity value, using the assets of X Co. as a
borrowing base and putting in no significant capital of its own. It must
delay purchase of the remaining 10% of X Co. to avoid triggering
liquidation and a class vote. But it can bide its time on that purchase
- the remaining common has no incentive to defect to the side of the
VC in internal votes. As in Adams, the VC cannot block the borrowing
unless a debt covenant is included in the preferred stock contract.
Without a debt covenant, and assuming both liquidation at maturity
and that X Co. still is worth only $500,000, VC now receives $300,000
rather than $400,000. Its equity upside rides largely unaffected.
The convoluted structure of the hypothesized merger shows that
the standard venture preferred merger provision is effective across a
broad range of merger and acquisition territory: normally, the
acquiring firm wants at least 51% of the voting equity. But the
hypothetical also shows that a loophole can be opened in a pinch.
With value on the table to be stripped, that cannot be considered an
event with a de minimis probability. As to the use of business
covenants which would block the borrowing in the foregoing
hypothetical, the literature signals variations in practice. Some lawyers
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suggest that business covenants should be included in the "investor
rights agreement" usually entered into between VC and E.'56 Other
descriptions of standard deal documentation make no mention of
business covenants. The Kaplan and Str6mberg numbers indirectly
suggest that business covenants are the exception rather than the rule.
They report that 20% of their cases involved contract provisions
contingent on subsequent financial performance, but none of the
provisions they describe are negative covenants.157
(b) The firm this time is Y Co., with common held by E amounting
to 60% of the shares (6,000 total) and the preferred held by VC 40%
(4,000 total). The liquidation value of the preferred is $100 (or
$400,000). The total value of Y Co. is $640,000. Y Co. merges into B
Co., which has 6000 shares of common outstanding prior to the
merger. The total merger consideration is $640,000. The merger treats
Y Co.'s two classes of stock differentially so far as concerns
consideration. Each share of common gets one share of the surviving
corporation worth $80 per share if no preferred is converted prior to
the merger; the stock is worth $64 if all of the preferred is converted
prior to the merger. The preferred gets cash worth $40 per share.
Here, since more than 50% of the stock of the surviving corporation is
held by Y Co. holders, the liquidation/class vote provision is not
triggered. Given a conversion privilege, the preferred can convert into
common on a one-to-one basis prior to the merger closing. If all of the
preferred converts 10,000 shares will share the merger consideration,
which will thus be worth $64 per share. If the merger were a
liquidation, the preferred would have a right to receive $100 per share
in cash.
Once again, the scenario is convoluted. This merger averts
triggering the clause only because the acquiring corporation has the
same number of common shares outstanding as the target. Post-
merger, Y Co. common and B Co. common each hold 6,000 shares. If
VC converts, former Y Co. investors hold 10,000 of 16,000. Since, by
hypothesis, the Y Co. shares are held by a handful of actors, control in
effect passes to Y Co. actors, something the firm in B Co. 's position is
unlikely to countenance. It is more likely in the case of stock-for-stock
deal like this that the B Co. holders end up with a clear majority. That
156. Plumridge, supra note 154, at 647; Kathryn K. Lindauer, Critical Issues in
Negotiating Venture Capital for the Software Development Company, in 19TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 799, 321-22 (PLI Patents, Copyright, Trademarks, and
Literary Property, Course Handbook Series No. 547, 1999).
157. Kaplan & Str6mberg, supra note 12 (working paper at 19 & tbl.6). It is entirely
possible that Kaplan and Str6mberg were not looking to see if the investor rights agreements
in their transactions contained business covenants. It also is possible to draft negative
covenants that do not turn on future financial performance figures. One can, for example,
completely forbid short term borrowing and funded debt without regulating it by reference
to a balance sheet test.
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case, of course, triggers the clause. Alternatively, B Co. pays in cash,
debt securities, nonvoting common, or a mix of any of those with
voting stock. In all of those cases, the deal in all probability triggers
the clause.
(c) One glaring loophole remains: the fact pattern of the Bove case
described above. This time the firm is Z Co. It has 6000 shares of
common outstanding held by E amounting to 60% of its total shares
(6,000 total); 4,000 shares (40%) of preferred are held by VC. The
liquidation value of the preferred is $100 (or $400,000); the dividends
are cumulative and $100,000 in arrears. Z Co. 's total value is $500,000.
Z Co. creates a shell, wholly owned subsidiary, EZ Corp., and merges
into it. Pursuant to the merger agreement (drafted by E), the
preferred and common of Z Co. are to receive common of EZ Corp.,
5,001 shares to the common and 4,999 shares to the preferred. Since
the voting stock of the surviving corporation is held by the same
holders as the voting stock of the transferor corporation, the clause is
not triggered and VC cannot block the deal under the contract. VC
will have a plausible case for breach of fiduciary duty and will be able
to bring an appraisal proceeding pursuant to which it will be able to
claim the value of its shares in cash. Both lawsuits are powerful
weapons, but expensive. A roadblock built into the contract would be
cheaper.
One wonders why the drafters of venture capital documents have
not taken the simple step of forbidding any and all mergers absent a
preferred class vote. In a negotiation over such a term, the anticipated
objection would be that across-the-board vetoes in VC create their
own risk of opportunism - the VC with a veto can hold up the deal so
as to extract a disproportionately large consideration. But E already is
taking that risk with respect to all deals entailing a control transfer,
and the more fully drafted term does not materially enhance its
exposure.
C. Summary
Whether the glass of protection for preferred stockholders on the
middle ground between draw down and redemption is half empty or
half full remains a question. The venture capital arrangements
discussed here derive many of their features from the practice of small
business planning. Fitted to the startup firm's closely held status, these
contracts are intensely relational as they simultaneously encourage
entrepreneurs to maximize firm value while blocking opportunism
against outside capital. They also reflect the fact that venture
capitalists are not passive investors. Portfolio companies look to them
for management assistance and service as reputational intermediaries
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with customers and suppliers.' No diffusion of this contracting
pattern to mature issuers and the public securities markets which
concerned Graham and Dodd should be expected.
CONCLUSION
This Article's choice of incomplete contracts economics to describe
venture capital contracts has normative implications. The economics
suggest that ex post Coasian bargaining is not a vehicle well suited to
optimal incentive alignment in corporations. Accordingly, when
governance disputes erupt, a set of instructions needs to come from
somewhere. The economics also suggest a zone of preference for
shared control and process over advance specification. Accordingly,
instructions will not always come in the form of advance contract
specifications, and the legal system will be on call to provide third-
party umpires.
On the matter of judicial umpiring, standard law and economics
joins with the Delaware courts to counsel against intervention to
protect relational victims on the theory that transacting parties should
be encouraged to specify everything in advance in contracts.
Alternatively, when the interests of common and senior holders
conflict, law and economics again joins with Delaware in presuming in
favor of the common. Here the theory is that short of an extreme
distress situation, value is maximized when management decisions are
aligned with the interests of the residual risk holder.
The incomplete contracts economics presented in this Article
suggests a more circumspect approach. Where subject matter is
noncontractible, a blanket presumption against ex post intervention
on the ground of forced contract is incoherent. Furthermore, the
control transfer model shows that efficient results and the interests of
senior securityholders are aligned in a larger set of cases than
previously supposed. When disputes between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs come to court, a rote presumption favoring the
common stockholder is not defensible on efficiency grounds.
A legal case arises for better treatment of preferred. As presented
here, the case asks for very little. No new fiduciary duty has to be
implied. No new corporate tort need be invented. Conventional
contract law merely needs to be applied in an evenhanded way. So
doing would only enhance the reviewing court's reputation for
responsiveness to business interests.
158. Sahlman, supra note 7, at 508. For a formal of the interactive relationship of
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs at the draw down stage, see Rafael Repullo & Javier
Suarez, Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No.
145134, 1999), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=145134.
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